Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084 |
Resumo: | This article aims at giving a brief comment on Denis Fisette’s interpretation of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness by Franz Brentano, where consciousness has been seen as a form of intransitive self-consciousness being intrinsic to the agent. In agreement with that interpretation, I want to present a few more basic arguments in order to support that assumption such as, for example, some epistemic thoughts by Brentano given in his books Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874) and Die Deskriptive Psychologie (1982). The present paper has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the initial understanding of psychology in Brentano. Section two deals with the concepts of consciousness and intentionality. In the third section, the classification of mental phenomena will be presented. Section four refers to the concept of descriptive psychology or phenomenology and finally, I will show the consequences of Brentano’s epistemic and ontological arguments related to his concept of consciousness. |
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Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
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Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousnessPhilosophy of mind. Brentano. Higher order theory of consciousness. Consciousness. Descriptive psychology.Filosofia da mente. Brentano. Teoria de ordem superior da consciência. Consciência. Psicologia descritiva.This article aims at giving a brief comment on Denis Fisette’s interpretation of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness by Franz Brentano, where consciousness has been seen as a form of intransitive self-consciousness being intrinsic to the agent. In agreement with that interpretation, I want to present a few more basic arguments in order to support that assumption such as, for example, some epistemic thoughts by Brentano given in his books Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874) and Die Deskriptive Psychologie (1982). The present paper has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the initial understanding of psychology in Brentano. Section two deals with the concepts of consciousness and intentionality. In the third section, the classification of mental phenomena will be presented. Section four refers to the concept of descriptive psychology or phenomenology and finally, I will show the consequences of Brentano’s epistemic and ontological arguments related to his concept of consciousness. Este artigo tem por objetivo fazer um breve comentário sobre a interpretação de Denis Fisette das teorias de ordem superior da consciência feitas por Franz Brentano, onde a consciência tem sido vista como uma forma de auto-consciência intransitiva, sendo intrínseca a um agente. De acordo com esta interpretaçao, gostaria de apresentar alguns argumentos básicos para dar suporte àquela assunção, tais como, por exemplo, alguns pensamentos epistêmicos de Brentano dados nas obras Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874) e Die Deskriptive Psychologie (1982). O presente trabalho foi dividido em cinco seções. A primeira seção trata do entendimento inicial a respeito da psicologia de Brentano. A seção dois lida com os conceitos de consciência e intencionalidade. Na terceira secão, será apresentada a classificação do fenômeno mental. A seção quatro se refere ao conceito de psicologia descritiva e à fenomenologia e finalmente, mostrarei as consequências dos argumentos epistêmicos e ontológicos de Brentano relacionados ao conceito de conciência. Universidade Federal do Ceará2015-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 13Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 13Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 131984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084/29802Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarques de Carvalho, Joelma2021-03-13T01:21:15Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/19084Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-03-13T01:21:15Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
title |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
spellingShingle |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness Marques de Carvalho, Joelma Philosophy of mind. Brentano. Higher order theory of consciousness. Consciousness. Descriptive psychology. Filosofia da mente. Brentano. Teoria de ordem superior da consciência. Consciência. Psicologia descritiva. |
title_short |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
title_full |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
title_fullStr |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
title_full_unstemmed |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
title_sort |
Franz Brentano’s higher-order theories of consciousness |
author |
Marques de Carvalho, Joelma |
author_facet |
Marques de Carvalho, Joelma |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Marques de Carvalho, Joelma |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Philosophy of mind. Brentano. Higher order theory of consciousness. Consciousness. Descriptive psychology. Filosofia da mente. Brentano. Teoria de ordem superior da consciência. Consciência. Psicologia descritiva. |
topic |
Philosophy of mind. Brentano. Higher order theory of consciousness. Consciousness. Descriptive psychology. Filosofia da mente. Brentano. Teoria de ordem superior da consciência. Consciência. Psicologia descritiva. |
description |
This article aims at giving a brief comment on Denis Fisette’s interpretation of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness by Franz Brentano, where consciousness has been seen as a form of intransitive self-consciousness being intrinsic to the agent. In agreement with that interpretation, I want to present a few more basic arguments in order to support that assumption such as, for example, some epistemic thoughts by Brentano given in his books Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (1874) and Die Deskriptive Psychologie (1982). The present paper has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the initial understanding of psychology in Brentano. Section two deals with the concepts of consciousness and intentionality. In the third section, the classification of mental phenomena will be presented. Section four refers to the concept of descriptive psychology or phenomenology and finally, I will show the consequences of Brentano’s epistemic and ontological arguments related to his concept of consciousness. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19084/29802 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 13 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 13 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 13 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
_version_ |
1797068845904560128 |