Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027 |
Resumo: | In this paper, I argue, on the basis of textual evidence, that two conceptions of object instead of one are present in the Tractatus. One of them, based on the notions of a complete analysis of meaningful sentences and of absolute simplicity, was explicitly endorsed by Wittgenstein on purely logical grounds as the official doctrine of the book while the other, based on the notions of a multidimensional formal analysis and of singularity, was noncommittally entertained by him in the form of an analogy between the object’s relation to its ‘surrounding’ logical space (of states of affairs) and the relation of a phenomenal item to the specific sense modality it belongs to and in which it is located. Armed with this distinction, I attempt to clarify the debate around the issue of the exemplarity of certain categories of things (particulars, universals) with respect to the logical notion of a Tractarian object. I also give my interpretation of how Wittgenstein deals in the Tractatus with the problem of the incompatibility of certain color ascriptions, and of the related episode of the abandonment of logical atomism in the early so-called ‘transitional period’. |
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Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
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Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicusTractatus logico-philosophicus. Object. Simplicity. Singularity. Exemplarity. Multidimensional sensory spaces. Logical Atomism.Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Objeto. Simplicidade. Singularidade. Exemplaridade. Espaços sensoriais multidimensionais. Atomismo lógico.In this paper, I argue, on the basis of textual evidence, that two conceptions of object instead of one are present in the Tractatus. One of them, based on the notions of a complete analysis of meaningful sentences and of absolute simplicity, was explicitly endorsed by Wittgenstein on purely logical grounds as the official doctrine of the book while the other, based on the notions of a multidimensional formal analysis and of singularity, was noncommittally entertained by him in the form of an analogy between the object’s relation to its ‘surrounding’ logical space (of states of affairs) and the relation of a phenomenal item to the specific sense modality it belongs to and in which it is located. Armed with this distinction, I attempt to clarify the debate around the issue of the exemplarity of certain categories of things (particulars, universals) with respect to the logical notion of a Tractarian object. I also give my interpretation of how Wittgenstein deals in the Tractatus with the problem of the incompatibility of certain color ascriptions, and of the related episode of the abandonment of logical atomism in the early so-called ‘transitional period’.No presente artigo, argumenta-se, com base em evidências textuais, que há duas concepções de objeto presentes no Tractatus. A primeira, norteada pelas noções de analizabilidade completa e de simplicidade absoluta, foi explicitamente assumida por Wittgenstein como doutrina oficial do livro por razões puramente lógicas. A segunda, norteada pelas noções de análise formal multidimensional e de singularidade, só foi contemplada por ele com base em uma analogia entre a relação do objeto (em sentido lógico) ao espaço de possíveis estados de coisas que o ‘cerca’ e a de um item fenomenal qualquer à modalidade sensorial na qual está localizado. À luz dessa distinção, tenta-se clarificar o debate acerca da exemplaridade (ou não exemplaridade) de certas categorias de coisas (particulares, universais) em relação à noção tractariana de objeto. E dá ainda uma interpretação do tratamento por Wittgenstein do problema da incompatibilidade de certas atribuições de cores no Tractatuse do episódio do abandono do atomismo lógico no início do chamado ‘período intermediário’.Universidade Federal do Ceará2013-07-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 10Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 10Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 101984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027/29746Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSoutif, Ludovic2021-03-11T16:41:17Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/19027Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-03-11T16:41:17Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
title |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
spellingShingle |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus Soutif, Ludovic Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Object. Simplicity. Singularity. Exemplarity. Multidimensional sensory spaces. Logical Atomism. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Objeto. Simplicidade. Singularidade. Exemplaridade. Espaços sensoriais multidimensionais. Atomismo lógico. |
title_short |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
title_full |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
title_fullStr |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
title_full_unstemmed |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
title_sort |
Simplicity or singularity? Two conceptions of object in the Tratactus logico-philosophicus |
author |
Soutif, Ludovic |
author_facet |
Soutif, Ludovic |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Soutif, Ludovic |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Object. Simplicity. Singularity. Exemplarity. Multidimensional sensory spaces. Logical Atomism. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Objeto. Simplicidade. Singularidade. Exemplaridade. Espaços sensoriais multidimensionais. Atomismo lógico. |
topic |
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Object. Simplicity. Singularity. Exemplarity. Multidimensional sensory spaces. Logical Atomism. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Objeto. Simplicidade. Singularidade. Exemplaridade. Espaços sensoriais multidimensionais. Atomismo lógico. |
description |
In this paper, I argue, on the basis of textual evidence, that two conceptions of object instead of one are present in the Tractatus. One of them, based on the notions of a complete analysis of meaningful sentences and of absolute simplicity, was explicitly endorsed by Wittgenstein on purely logical grounds as the official doctrine of the book while the other, based on the notions of a multidimensional formal analysis and of singularity, was noncommittally entertained by him in the form of an analogy between the object’s relation to its ‘surrounding’ logical space (of states of affairs) and the relation of a phenomenal item to the specific sense modality it belongs to and in which it is located. Armed with this distinction, I attempt to clarify the debate around the issue of the exemplarity of certain categories of things (particulars, universals) with respect to the logical notion of a Tractarian object. I also give my interpretation of how Wittgenstein deals in the Tractatus with the problem of the incompatibility of certain color ascriptions, and of the related episode of the abandonment of logical atomism in the early so-called ‘transitional period’. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-07-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19027/29746 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 10 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 10 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 10 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
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1797068845483032576 |