Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes Lima
Data de Publicação: 2009
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFC
Texto Completo: http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=10104
Resumo: This work aimed at to analyze the allocation of the financial costs in projects of multiple uses in the section of water resources, among different purposes of use of the water. Such projects are cheaper because, they present scale savings due to the shared use of the resources, thus, the central problem that appears is as allocating the costs among the participants of the project. It was taken as example the fishing reservoir in the municipal district of Capistrano, and the one of Figueiredo in the municipal district of High Saint, both in CearÃ. The methodology used to allocate the costs among the purposes of the projects was given by the rule of defined allocation as value of Shapley, belonging to the theory of the cooperative games. For the project of the Fishing reservoir, the allocated values of the total cost among the integral purposes, they satisfy the beginnings of justness, resulting in a fair and efficient solution, what indicates for that case studied that the solution is in the nucleus of the game. A different conclusion is removed of the results generated for the other used example. The obtained allocations are not in agreement with one of the beginnings of justness, indicating a solution no belonging to the nucleus of the game, which defines impartiality in the allocations obtained for the project of Figueiredo's reservoir.
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spelling info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisAllocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley valueAlocaÃÃo de custos em projetos de usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos: uma aplicaÃÃo do valor de Shapley2009-09-03Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto35625660344http://lattes.cnpq.br/7568927888412924MaurÃcio Benegas10510899796http://lattes.cnpq.br/6095762582986164Francisco de Assis de Souza Filho23199610382http://lattes.cnpq.br/498896638684875999639556300http://lattes.cnpq.br/9231409004082387Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes LimaUniversidade Federal do CearÃPrograma de PÃs-GraduaÃÃo em Economia - CAENUFCBRAlocaÃÃo de custo Usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos Valor de ShapleyCost allocation Multiple uses of water resources Value of ShapleyCIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADASThis work aimed at to analyze the allocation of the financial costs in projects of multiple uses in the section of water resources, among different purposes of use of the water. Such projects are cheaper because, they present scale savings due to the shared use of the resources, thus, the central problem that appears is as allocating the costs among the participants of the project. It was taken as example the fishing reservoir in the municipal district of Capistrano, and the one of Figueiredo in the municipal district of High Saint, both in CearÃ. The methodology used to allocate the costs among the purposes of the projects was given by the rule of defined allocation as value of Shapley, belonging to the theory of the cooperative games. For the project of the Fishing reservoir, the allocated values of the total cost among the integral purposes, they satisfy the beginnings of justness, resulting in a fair and efficient solution, what indicates for that case studied that the solution is in the nucleus of the game. A different conclusion is removed of the results generated for the other used example. The obtained allocations are not in agreement with one of the beginnings of justness, indicating a solution no belonging to the nucleus of the game, which defines impartiality in the allocations obtained for the project of Figueiredo's reservoir.Este trabalho objetivou analisar a alocaÃÃo dos custos financeiros em projetos de usos mÃltiplos no setor de recursos hÃdricos, entre diferentes finalidades de uso da Ãgua. Tais projetos sÃo mais baratos porque, apresentam economias de escala devido ao uso compartilhado dos recursos, assim, o problema central que surge à como alocar os custos entre os participantes do projeto. Tomou-se como exemplo o reservatÃrio Pesqueiro no municÃpio de Capistrano, e o de Figueiredo no municÃpio de Alto Santo, ambos no CearÃ. A metodologia utilizada para alocar os custos entre as finalidades dos projetos foi dada pela regra de alocaÃÃo definida como valor de Shapley, pertencente à teoria dos jogos cooperativos. Para o projeto do reservatÃrio Pesqueiro, os valores alocados do custo total entre as finalidades integrantes, satisfazem os princÃpios de equidade, resultando em uma soluÃÃo justa e eficiente, o que indica para esse caso estudado que a soluÃÃo està no nÃcleo do jogo. Uma distinta conclusÃo à retirada dos resultados gerados para o outro exemplo utilizado. As alocaÃÃes obtidas nÃo estÃo de acordo com um dos princÃpios de equidade, indicando uma soluÃÃo nÃo pertencente ao nÃcleo do jogo, que define imparcialidade nas alocaÃÃes obtidas para o projeto do reservatÃrio de Figueiredo.Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgicohttp://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=10104application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessporreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFCinstname:Universidade Federal do Cearáinstacron:UFC2019-01-21T11:23:06Zmail@mail.com -
dc.title.en.fl_str_mv Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
dc.title.alternative.pt.fl_str_mv AlocaÃÃo de custos em projetos de usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos: uma aplicaÃÃo do valor de Shapley
title Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
spellingShingle Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes Lima
AlocaÃÃo de custo
Usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos
Valor de Shapley
Cost allocation
Multiple uses of water resources
Value of Shapley
CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS
title_short Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
title_full Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
title_fullStr Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
title_full_unstemmed Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
title_sort Allocation of costs in projects of multiple uses of water resources: an application of Shapley value
author Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes Lima
author_facet Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes Lima
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto
dc.contributor.advisor1ID.fl_str_mv 35625660344
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/7568927888412924
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv MaurÃcio Benegas
dc.contributor.referee1ID.fl_str_mv 10510899796
dc.contributor.referee1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/6095762582986164
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Francisco de Assis de Souza Filho
dc.contributor.referee2ID.fl_str_mv 23199610382
dc.contributor.referee2Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/4988966386848759
dc.contributor.authorID.fl_str_mv 99639556300
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/9231409004082387
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lincoln Sarli Cesar Guedes Lima
contributor_str_mv Paulo de Melo Jorge Neto
MaurÃcio Benegas
Francisco de Assis de Souza Filho
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv AlocaÃÃo de custo
Usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos
Valor de Shapley
topic AlocaÃÃo de custo
Usos mÃltiplos de recursos hÃdricos
Valor de Shapley
Cost allocation
Multiple uses of water resources
Value of Shapley
CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Cost allocation
Multiple uses of water resources
Value of Shapley
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS
dc.description.sponsorship.fl_txt_mv Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico
dc.description.abstract.por.fl_txt_mv This work aimed at to analyze the allocation of the financial costs in projects of multiple uses in the section of water resources, among different purposes of use of the water. Such projects are cheaper because, they present scale savings due to the shared use of the resources, thus, the central problem that appears is as allocating the costs among the participants of the project. It was taken as example the fishing reservoir in the municipal district of Capistrano, and the one of Figueiredo in the municipal district of High Saint, both in CearÃ. The methodology used to allocate the costs among the purposes of the projects was given by the rule of defined allocation as value of Shapley, belonging to the theory of the cooperative games. For the project of the Fishing reservoir, the allocated values of the total cost among the integral purposes, they satisfy the beginnings of justness, resulting in a fair and efficient solution, what indicates for that case studied that the solution is in the nucleus of the game. A different conclusion is removed of the results generated for the other used example. The obtained allocations are not in agreement with one of the beginnings of justness, indicating a solution no belonging to the nucleus of the game, which defines impartiality in the allocations obtained for the project of Figueiredo's reservoir.
Este trabalho objetivou analisar a alocaÃÃo dos custos financeiros em projetos de usos mÃltiplos no setor de recursos hÃdricos, entre diferentes finalidades de uso da Ãgua. Tais projetos sÃo mais baratos porque, apresentam economias de escala devido ao uso compartilhado dos recursos, assim, o problema central que surge à como alocar os custos entre os participantes do projeto. Tomou-se como exemplo o reservatÃrio Pesqueiro no municÃpio de Capistrano, e o de Figueiredo no municÃpio de Alto Santo, ambos no CearÃ. A metodologia utilizada para alocar os custos entre as finalidades dos projetos foi dada pela regra de alocaÃÃo definida como valor de Shapley, pertencente à teoria dos jogos cooperativos. Para o projeto do reservatÃrio Pesqueiro, os valores alocados do custo total entre as finalidades integrantes, satisfazem os princÃpios de equidade, resultando em uma soluÃÃo justa e eficiente, o que indica para esse caso estudado que a soluÃÃo està no nÃcleo do jogo. Uma distinta conclusÃo à retirada dos resultados gerados para o outro exemplo utilizado. As alocaÃÃes obtidas nÃo estÃo de acordo com um dos princÃpios de equidade, indicando uma soluÃÃo nÃo pertencente ao nÃcleo do jogo, que define imparcialidade nas alocaÃÃes obtidas para o projeto do reservatÃrio de Figueiredo.
description This work aimed at to analyze the allocation of the financial costs in projects of multiple uses in the section of water resources, among different purposes of use of the water. Such projects are cheaper because, they present scale savings due to the shared use of the resources, thus, the central problem that appears is as allocating the costs among the participants of the project. It was taken as example the fishing reservoir in the municipal district of Capistrano, and the one of Figueiredo in the municipal district of High Saint, both in CearÃ. The methodology used to allocate the costs among the purposes of the projects was given by the rule of defined allocation as value of Shapley, belonging to the theory of the cooperative games. For the project of the Fishing reservoir, the allocated values of the total cost among the integral purposes, they satisfy the beginnings of justness, resulting in a fair and efficient solution, what indicates for that case studied that the solution is in the nucleus of the game. A different conclusion is removed of the results generated for the other used example. The obtained allocations are not in agreement with one of the beginnings of justness, indicating a solution no belonging to the nucleus of the game, which defines impartiality in the allocations obtained for the project of Figueiredo's reservoir.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2009-09-03
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do CearÃ
dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv Programa de PÃs-GraduaÃÃo em Economia - CAEN
dc.publisher.initials.fl_str_mv UFC
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv BR
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do CearÃ
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFC
instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará
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