A teoria kantiana do agir racional
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFG |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883 |
Resumo: | Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action. |
id |
UFG-2_82670bdc7750e2bf079cd8a9ab2efe05 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repositorio.bc.ufg.br:tede/4883 |
network_acronym_str |
UFG-2 |
network_name_str |
Repositório Institucional da UFG |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo dahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/6711525917597159Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo daKlotz, Hans CrhistianBeckenkamp, Joãosinhohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5303020027663322Fernandes, Darley Alves2015-11-12T12:01:03Z2015-07-02FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015.http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883ark:/38995/001300000df34Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action.Nosso objetivo neste trabalho será o de oferecer uma perspectiva de compreensão do problema da liberdade da vontade e, respectivamente, uma solução possível para a questão a partir da Crítica da razão pura. Neste sentido, procuraremos definir o problema da liberdade da vontade como um problema a respeito da legislação do agir que nos leva a indagar quais são as regras, causas e normas que regem o agir humano. Quais são as leis e causas do agir humano? São as leis e causas naturais, desejos e inclinações, ou são leis e motivos racionais, princípios práticos? Interessa-nos defender a noção de agir racional livre que pressupõe, por um lado, uma razão prática que orienta o agir a partir de prescrições que comandam e impõem autoridade normativa e, por outro lado, a capacidade prático-deliberativa do agente de reconhecer e julgar tais prescrições. Toda a discussão terá por conceito central o arbítrio livre (liberdade prática). Portanto, investigaremos exaustivamente as características deste conceito, a estrutura, a espontaneidade, a relação com as demais faculdades e etc. No geral, a concepção de vontade livre que iremos defender depende, num primeiro momento, da espontaneidade e capacidade de autodeterminação do arbítrio frente às inclinações sensíveis. Obteremos o conceito de vontade a partir de uma explanação das características reflexivas do arbítrio e da faculdade de desejar, isto é, a vontade surgirá como algo necessário ao conceito de arbítrio livre. Por vontade livre nós devemos entender a capacidade humana de agir por meio da representação de leis e princípios prático-racionais, a capacidade de autodeterminação do querer por meio da razão prática e supressão das inclinações sensíveis mediante a possibilidade de agir por um motivo racional puro. Ao final veremos que a defesa da liberdade da vontade fornece-nos uma profícua teoria do agir racional.Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T11:58:02Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-02Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPESapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/retrieve/22684/Disserta%c3%a7%c3%a3o%20-%20Darley%20Alves%20Fernandes%20-%202015.pdf.jpgporUniversidade Federal de GoiásPrograma de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)UFGBrasilFaculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG)http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLiberdade da vontadeArbítrioVontadeEspontaneidadeCausasRazõesFreedom of the willFree choiceWillSpontaneityCausesReasonsCIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAA teoria kantiana do agir racionalThe kantian theory of rational actinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis-74011761163580643796006006006005585255767972561168-6723520209401670532075167498588264571reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFGinstname:Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG)instacron:UFGLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82165http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1e211fee-7a23-4fb0-8d0f-7a8e5618d625/downloadbd3efa91386c1718a7f26a329fdcb468MD51CC-LICENSElicense_urllicense_urltext/plain; charset=utf-849http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/71ef7d8a-81d8-4830-80ad-b36fdc2a5209/download4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2fMD52license_textlicense_texttext/html; charset=utf-821468http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/c72edbc2-d7ef-424a-840c-0117bd64d027/downloadae2fe251842ade1134c5d9bb99b6eefeMD53license_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-823148http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/8aac39ea-a76e-433d-bbee-3e05c2ca6eed/download9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306MD54ORIGINALDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdfDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdfapplication/pdf1106163http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1a498330-0558-4209-937e-f00fe789be6d/downloadfb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34MD55TEXTDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf.txtDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain387291http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1af5f182-8dd9-4319-89f0-fb1dd992b9fd/download5e30e48a1dcb73339fd9b5cb8f1a7494MD56THUMBNAILDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf.jpgDissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1947http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/8f9d781d-8fbd-44ec-aa61-4bf507d885ee/download5aa458473f90ff428e9ed2a225ecd0a9MD57tede/48832015-11-13 03:04:22.488http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Acesso Abertoopen.accessoai:repositorio.bc.ufg.br:tede/4883http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tedeRepositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/oai/requesttasesdissertacoes.bc@ufg.bropendoar:2015-11-13T05:04:22Repositório Institucional da UFG - Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG)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 |
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv |
The kantian theory of rational act |
title |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
spellingShingle |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional Fernandes, Darley Alves Liberdade da vontade Arbítrio Vontade Espontaneidade Causas Razões Freedom of the will Free choice Will Spontaneity Causes Reasons CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
title_full |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
title_fullStr |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
title_full_unstemmed |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
title_sort |
A teoria kantiana do agir racional |
author |
Fernandes, Darley Alves |
author_facet |
Fernandes, Darley Alves |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da |
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/6711525917597159 |
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da |
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv |
Klotz, Hans Crhistian |
dc.contributor.referee3.fl_str_mv |
Beckenkamp, Joãosinho |
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/5303020027663322 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Fernandes, Darley Alves |
contributor_str_mv |
Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da Klotz, Hans Crhistian Beckenkamp, Joãosinho |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Liberdade da vontade Arbítrio Vontade Espontaneidade Causas Razões |
topic |
Liberdade da vontade Arbítrio Vontade Espontaneidade Causas Razões Freedom of the will Free choice Will Spontaneity Causes Reasons CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Freedom of the will Free choice Will Spontaneity Causes Reasons |
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2015-11-12T12:01:03Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2015-07-02 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883 |
dc.identifier.dark.fl_str_mv |
ark:/38995/001300000df34 |
identifier_str_mv |
FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015. ark:/38995/001300000df34 |
url |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.program.fl_str_mv |
-7401176116358064379 |
dc.relation.confidence.fl_str_mv |
600 600 600 600 |
dc.relation.department.fl_str_mv |
5585255767972561168 |
dc.relation.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
-672352020940167053 |
dc.relation.sponsorship.fl_str_mv |
2075167498588264571 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Goiás |
dc.publisher.program.fl_str_mv |
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL) |
dc.publisher.initials.fl_str_mv |
UFG |
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv |
Brasil |
dc.publisher.department.fl_str_mv |
Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Goiás |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFG instname:Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) instacron:UFG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
instacron_str |
UFG |
institution |
UFG |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UFG |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UFG |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1e211fee-7a23-4fb0-8d0f-7a8e5618d625/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/71ef7d8a-81d8-4830-80ad-b36fdc2a5209/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/c72edbc2-d7ef-424a-840c-0117bd64d027/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/8aac39ea-a76e-433d-bbee-3e05c2ca6eed/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1a498330-0558-4209-937e-f00fe789be6d/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/1af5f182-8dd9-4319-89f0-fb1dd992b9fd/download http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/bitstreams/8f9d781d-8fbd-44ec-aa61-4bf507d885ee/download |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
bd3efa91386c1718a7f26a329fdcb468 4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2f ae2fe251842ade1134c5d9bb99b6eefe 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 5e30e48a1dcb73339fd9b5cb8f1a7494 5aa458473f90ff428e9ed2a225ecd0a9 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UFG - Universidade Federal de Goiás (UFG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
tasesdissertacoes.bc@ufg.br |
_version_ |
1811721519209906176 |