A teoria kantiana do agir racional

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Fernandes, Darley Alves
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFG
Texto Completo: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883
Resumo: Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action.
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spelling Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo dahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/6711525917597159Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo daKlotz, Hans CrhistianBeckenkamp, Joãosinhohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5303020027663322Fernandes, Darley Alves2015-11-12T12:01:03Z2015-07-02FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015.http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883ark:/38995/001300000df34Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action.Nosso objetivo neste trabalho será o de oferecer uma perspectiva de compreensão do problema da liberdade da vontade e, respectivamente, uma solução possível para a questão a partir da Crítica da razão pura. Neste sentido, procuraremos definir o problema da liberdade da vontade como um problema a respeito da legislação do agir que nos leva a indagar quais são as regras, causas e normas que regem o agir humano. Quais são as leis e causas do agir humano? São as leis e causas naturais, desejos e inclinações, ou são leis e motivos racionais, princípios práticos? Interessa-nos defender a noção de agir racional livre que pressupõe, por um lado, uma razão prática que orienta o agir a partir de prescrições que comandam e impõem autoridade normativa e, por outro lado, a capacidade prático-deliberativa do agente de reconhecer e julgar tais prescrições. Toda a discussão terá por conceito central o arbítrio livre (liberdade prática). Portanto, investigaremos exaustivamente as características deste conceito, a estrutura, a espontaneidade, a relação com as demais faculdades e etc. No geral, a concepção de vontade livre que iremos defender depende, num primeiro momento, da espontaneidade e capacidade de autodeterminação do arbítrio frente às inclinações sensíveis. Obteremos o conceito de vontade a partir de uma explanação das características reflexivas do arbítrio e da faculdade de desejar, isto é, a vontade surgirá como algo necessário ao conceito de arbítrio livre. Por vontade livre nós devemos entender a capacidade humana de agir por meio da representação de leis e princípios prático-racionais, a capacidade de autodeterminação do querer por meio da razão prática e supressão das inclinações sensíveis mediante a possibilidade de agir por um motivo racional puro. Ao final veremos que a defesa da liberdade da vontade fornece-nos uma profícua teoria do agir racional.Submitted by Cássia Santos (cassia.bcufg@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T11:58:02Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Darley Alves Fernandes - 2015.pdf: 1106163 bytes, checksum: fb5ca50b603407eb713dbf3b135e8b34 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5)Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z (GMT). 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dc.title.por.fl_str_mv A teoria kantiana do agir racional
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv The kantian theory of rational act
title A teoria kantiana do agir racional
spellingShingle A teoria kantiana do agir racional
Fernandes, Darley Alves
Liberdade da vontade
Arbítrio
Vontade
Espontaneidade
Causas
Razões
Freedom of the will
Free choice
Will
Spontaneity
Causes
Reasons
CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
title_short A teoria kantiana do agir racional
title_full A teoria kantiana do agir racional
title_fullStr A teoria kantiana do agir racional
title_full_unstemmed A teoria kantiana do agir racional
title_sort A teoria kantiana do agir racional
author Fernandes, Darley Alves
author_facet Fernandes, Darley Alves
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/6711525917597159
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Klotz, Hans Crhistian
dc.contributor.referee3.fl_str_mv Beckenkamp, Joãosinho
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/5303020027663322
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Fernandes, Darley Alves
contributor_str_mv Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da
Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo da
Klotz, Hans Crhistian
Beckenkamp, Joãosinho
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Liberdade da vontade
Arbítrio
Vontade
Espontaneidade
Causas
Razões
topic Liberdade da vontade
Arbítrio
Vontade
Espontaneidade
Causas
Razões
Freedom of the will
Free choice
Will
Spontaneity
Causes
Reasons
CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Freedom of the will
Free choice
Will
Spontaneity
Causes
Reasons
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
description Our goal in this work will be to offer a perspective of understanding the problem freedom of the will and, respectively, a possible solution to the question from the Critique of pure reason. In this sense, we will seek to define the problem of freedom of the will as a problem concerning the legislation of act which lead us to ask what are the rules, causes and norms governing human act. What are the laws and causes of human action? Are the natural laws and causes, desires and inclinations, or are the laws and rational motives, practical principles? We are interested in defending the notion of free rational act presuppose, on the one hand, a practical reason that guides the action from prescription that command and impose normative authority and, on the other hand, the practical-deliberative ability of the agent to recognize and judging such prescriptions. All discussion is throughout by the concept of free choice (practical freedom). Therefore, we will investigate exhaustively the characteristics of this concept, the structure, spontaneity, relation with other faculties, and so on. Overall, the conception of free will that we will defend depends, at first, of spontaneity and self- determination capacity of free choice face the sensible inclinations. We get the concept of will (Wille) from an explanation of the reflective characteristics of free choice and faculty of desire, that is, the concept of will arises as necessary to the concept of free choice. By free will we must understanding the human ability to act through representation of laws and practical-rational principles, the ability of self-determination of the desire by means practical reason overcoming of inclinations by the possibility of acting on a pure rational motive. At the end we will see that freedom of the will defense provides us with a fruitful theory of action.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2015-11-12T12:01:03Z
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4883
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identifier_str_mv FERNANDES, D. A. A teoria kantiana do agir racional. 2015. 140 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiânia, 2015.
ark:/38995/001300000df34
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