O conceito do mal: uma investigação a partir de Hannah Arendt

• Autor(a) principal: Oliveira Filho, Valério Luiz de
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFG
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/13185
• topic: Mal; Genocídio; Nazismo; Hannah Arendt; Bem; Evil; Genocide; Nazism; Hannah Arendt; Good; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

This dissertation focuses on Nazi totalitarianism, and on the events that took place in the Third Reich's concentration and extermination camps, in order to establish, inductively, an order of phenomena that can epitomize what is assigned the value evil. For this investigation, the work of Hannah Arendt is used as a theoretical reference, as it relates precisely Nazism and its death camps to the problem of evil in philosophy. In the first chapter, the dissertation defends the hypothesis of “good” as any being in the sensible world, with its respective foundations, and of “evil” as the violation of beings and their conditions of possibility. It is shown that Arendt's “radical evil”, in the sense of extreme evil, is an assessment of the intensity of these violations. The second chapter analyzes some of the thinkers with whom Hannah Arendt engaged in dialogue and, in the course of her work, she identified as representatives of the “tradition of our thought”. We will work with the hypothesis that this tradition, namely, the one that starts from Ancient Greece, passes through Augustine and arrives at the Kantian “radical evil”, has always been anchored in the presupposition of a moral order originally present in the world and in human beings, from which the phenomenon of evil can be interpreted as deviation. In the third chapter, it is argued, based on the metaphor of the “web of relationships” present in the work The Human Condition, that evil is not a mere deviation in relation to some rationally and cosmologically pre-established harmony, but, on the contrary, it is the state towards which human experience and spirit tend when beings do not recognize each other, the different “goods”, in the space of plurality. It demonstrates how the “good” of each being is fragile in the face of a potential confrontation with those of all others, and that, therefore, the plural balance and mutual recognition between these “goods” constitute what makes humanity, as humanity, possible. Such a balance, argues the dissertation, is not natural, as it weakens with the lack of political care; or, in Arendt's words, of “care for the world”. And to the extent that the very formation of the human as a person capable of moral judgment, and also the formation of the conscience of evil as the violation of the other, depend on a worldly arrangement balanced and plural enough to make possible the presence of this other in the self, the “banality of evil” would be the other side of the fragility of good.