The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ciccarelli, Vincenzo
Publication Date: 2020
Format: Article
Language: eng
Source: Repositório Institucional da UFLA
Download full: http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396
Summary: According to the Bad Company objection, the fact that Frege’s infamous Basic Law V instantiates the general definitional pattern of higher-order abstraction principles is a good reason to doubt the soundness of this sort of definitions. In this paper I argue against this objection by showing that the definitional pattern of abstraction principles – as extrapolated from §64 of Frege’s Grundlagen– includes an additional requirement (which I call the specificity condition) that is not satisfied by the Basic Law V while is satisfied by other higher-order abstractions such as Hume’s Principle. I also show that the failure of this additional requirement in the case of Basic Law V is engendered by an essential feature of Frege’s conception of logic and thus that Frege himself should not have regarded the Basic Law V as a definition by abstraction.
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spelling The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logicA objeção de má companhia e a extensionalidade da lógica da FregeAbstraction principlesContent recarvingBad company objectionFrege’s logicPrincípios de AbstraçãoMá companhiaReentalhamento do conteúdoLógica de FregeAccording to the Bad Company objection, the fact that Frege’s infamous Basic Law V instantiates the general definitional pattern of higher-order abstraction principles is a good reason to doubt the soundness of this sort of definitions. In this paper I argue against this objection by showing that the definitional pattern of abstraction principles – as extrapolated from §64 of Frege’s Grundlagen– includes an additional requirement (which I call the specificity condition) that is not satisfied by the Basic Law V while is satisfied by other higher-order abstractions such as Hume’s Principle. I also show that the failure of this additional requirement in the case of Basic Law V is engendered by an essential feature of Frege’s conception of logic and thus that Frege himself should not have regarded the Basic Law V as a definition by abstraction.Segundo a objeção da Má Companhia, o fato de que a infame Lei Básica V de Frege proporciona o padrão de definição geral dos princípios de abstração superior é uma boa razão para duvidar da validade deste tipo de definições. Neste artigo, eu argumento contra esta objeção, mostrando que o padrão de definição dos princípios de abstração — como extrapolados a partir do §64 do Grunlagen de Frege — inclui um requisito adicional (que denomino como a condição de especificidade) que não é satisfeito pela Lei Básica V, embora seja satisfeito por outras abstrações de ordem superior, tal como o Princípio de Hume. Mostro também que a falha deste requisito adicional no caso da Lei Básica V é engendrada por uma característica essencial da concepção de Frege da lógica, e que, assim, o próprio Frege não deveria ter tomado a Lei Básica V como uma definição por abstração.Universidade Federal de Pernambuco2021-05-27T17:10:35Z2021-05-27T17:10:35Z2020info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfCICCARELLI, V. The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 231-247, 2020.http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396Perspectiva Filosóficareponame:Repositório Institucional da UFLAinstname:Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)instacron:UFLAAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCiccarelli, Vincenzoeng2021-05-27T17:10:36Zoai:localhost:1/46396Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.ufla.br/oai/requestnivaldo@ufla.br || repositorio.biblioteca@ufla.bropendoar:2021-05-27T17:10:36Repositório Institucional da UFLA - Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
A objeção de má companhia e a extensionalidade da lógica da Frege
title The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
spellingShingle The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
Ciccarelli, Vincenzo
Abstraction principles
Content recarving
Bad company objection
Frege’s logic
Princípios de Abstração
Má companhia
Reentalhamento do conteúdo
Lógica de Frege
title_short The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
title_full The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
title_fullStr The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
title_full_unstemmed The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
title_sort The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic
author Ciccarelli, Vincenzo
author_facet Ciccarelli, Vincenzo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ciccarelli, Vincenzo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Abstraction principles
Content recarving
Bad company objection
Frege’s logic
Princípios de Abstração
Má companhia
Reentalhamento do conteúdo
Lógica de Frege
topic Abstraction principles
Content recarving
Bad company objection
Frege’s logic
Princípios de Abstração
Má companhia
Reentalhamento do conteúdo
Lógica de Frege
description According to the Bad Company objection, the fact that Frege’s infamous Basic Law V instantiates the general definitional pattern of higher-order abstraction principles is a good reason to doubt the soundness of this sort of definitions. In this paper I argue against this objection by showing that the definitional pattern of abstraction principles – as extrapolated from §64 of Frege’s Grundlagen– includes an additional requirement (which I call the specificity condition) that is not satisfied by the Basic Law V while is satisfied by other higher-order abstractions such as Hume’s Principle. I also show that the failure of this additional requirement in the case of Basic Law V is engendered by an essential feature of Frege’s conception of logic and thus that Frege himself should not have regarded the Basic Law V as a definition by abstraction.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020
2021-05-27T17:10:35Z
2021-05-27T17:10:35Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv CICCARELLI, V. The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 231-247, 2020.
http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396
identifier_str_mv CICCARELLI, V. The bad company objection and the extensionality of Frege’s logic. Perspectiva Filosófica, Recife, v. 47, n. 2, p. 231-247, 2020.
url http://repositorio.ufla.br/jspui/handle/1/46396
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Perspectiva Filosófica
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFLA
instname:Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
instacron:UFLA
instname_str Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
instacron_str UFLA
institution UFLA
reponame_str Repositório Institucional da UFLA
collection Repositório Institucional da UFLA
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da UFLA - Universidade Federal de Lavras (UFLA)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv nivaldo@ufla.br || repositorio.biblioteca@ufla.br
_version_ 1784550049119731712

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