Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/77217 |
Resumo: | A famous passage in Section 64 of Frege’s Grundlagen may be seen as a justification for the truth of abstraction principles. The justification is grounded in the procedure of content recarving which Frege describes in the passage. In this paper I argue that Frege’s procedure of content recarving while possibly correct in the case of first-order equivalence relations is insufficient to grant the truth of second-order abstractions. Moreover, I propose a possible way of justifying second-order abstractions by referring to the operation of content recarving and I show that the proposal relies to a certain extent on the Basic Law V. Therefore, if we are to justify the truth of second-order abstractions by invoking the content recarving procedure we are committed to a special status of some instances of the Basic Law V and thus to a special status of extensions of concepts as abstract objects. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstractionAbstraction principlesBasic Law Vcontent recarvinghigher-order logicA famous passage in Section 64 of Frege’s Grundlagen may be seen as a justification for the truth of abstraction principles. The justification is grounded in the procedure of content recarving which Frege describes in the passage. In this paper I argue that Frege’s procedure of content recarving while possibly correct in the case of first-order equivalence relations is insufficient to grant the truth of second-order abstractions. Moreover, I propose a possible way of justifying second-order abstractions by referring to the operation of content recarving and I show that the proposal relies to a certain extent on the Basic Law V. Therefore, if we are to justify the truth of second-order abstractions by invoking the content recarving procedure we are committed to a special status of some instances of the Basic Law V and thus to a special status of extensions of concepts as abstract objects.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2022-08-19info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/7721710.5007/1808-1711.2022.e77217Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 183-204Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 183-204Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 183-2041808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/77217/51418Copyright (c) 2021 Vincenzo Ciccarellihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCiccarelli, Vincenzo2022-08-19T16:53:29Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/77217Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2022-08-19T16:53:29Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
title |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
spellingShingle |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction Ciccarelli, Vincenzo Abstraction principles Basic Law V content recarving higher-order logic |
title_short |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
title_full |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
title_fullStr |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
title_full_unstemmed |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
title_sort |
Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction |
author |
Ciccarelli, Vincenzo |
author_facet |
Ciccarelli, Vincenzo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Ciccarelli, Vincenzo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Abstraction principles Basic Law V content recarving higher-order logic |
topic |
Abstraction principles Basic Law V content recarving higher-order logic |
description |
A famous passage in Section 64 of Frege’s Grundlagen may be seen as a justification for the truth of abstraction principles. The justification is grounded in the procedure of content recarving which Frege describes in the passage. In this paper I argue that Frege’s procedure of content recarving while possibly correct in the case of first-order equivalence relations is insufficient to grant the truth of second-order abstractions. Moreover, I propose a possible way of justifying second-order abstractions by referring to the operation of content recarving and I show that the proposal relies to a certain extent on the Basic Law V. Therefore, if we are to justify the truth of second-order abstractions by invoking the content recarving procedure we are committed to a special status of some instances of the Basic Law V and thus to a special status of extensions of concepts as abstract objects. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-08-19 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/77217 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e77217 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/77217 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e77217 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/77217/51418 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Vincenzo Ciccarelli http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Vincenzo Ciccarelli http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2022); 183-204 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2022); 183-204 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 26 n. 2 (2022); 183-204 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435108860624896 |