HOW THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON UNDERMINES THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

• Autor(a) principal: Briceño, Sebastián
• Data de Publicação: 2024
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Kriterion (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/42035
• topic: Cosmological argument; Principle of Sufficient Reason; Necessitarianism; Bradley’s regress; Monism; Argumento cosmológico; Princípio da Razão Suficiente; Necessitarianismo; Regresso de Bradley; Monismo

My aim here is to show how the Cosmological Argument (CA)is undermined by one of its own premises: the Principle of Sufficient Reason(PSR). Firstly, I explain the type of CA that I am thinking about (I). Secondly, Iexplain a traditional modal objection against the PSR, which is ultimately basedupon our intuitions in favor of contingency (II). Thirdly, I show how this modalobjection begs the question against the necessitarian, and then I reformulatethe CA in more neutral terms (III). Fourthly, using this more neutral versionof the CA, I argue that the main problem with the PSR goes way beyond itsapparent necessitarian consequences. As an argument used by Bradley shows,embracing the rationalist path that underlies the PSR seems to commit us toa form of Radical Monism too (IV). Finally, I conclude by showing how thisresult ultimately undermines the CA itself (V).