Monismo, Relaciones, Y Los Límites De La Explicación Metafísica

• Autor(a) principal: Briceño Domínguez, Sebastián
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: spa
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/9403
• topic: principle of sufficient reason, monism, relations, Bradley’s regress, emptiness; principio de razón suficiente, monismo, relaciones, regreso de Bradley, vacuidad

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR.