LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Kriterion (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647 |
Resumo: | Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law-applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions – that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims |
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LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATIONlawjustificationauthorityjusticeMany prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law-applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions – that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claimsRevista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2020-10-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 145 (2020)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 145 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 145 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 145 (2020)Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 145 (2020)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647/20002Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFaggion, Andrea2020-10-02T19:43:56Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/25647Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-01-24T12:41:25.127972Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
title |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
spellingShingle |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION Faggion, Andrea law justification authority justice |
title_short |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
title_full |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
title_fullStr |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
title_full_unstemmed |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
title_sort |
LAW AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION |
author |
Faggion, Andrea |
author_facet |
Faggion, Andrea |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faggion, Andrea |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
law justification authority justice |
topic |
law justification authority justice |
description |
Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law-applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions – that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-10-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25647/20002 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 145 (2020) Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 145 (2020) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 145 (2020) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 145 (2020) Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 145 (2020) 1981-5336 0100-512X reponame:Kriterion (Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
collection |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistakriterion@gmail.com |
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1799711183007121408 |