HUME’S MITIGATED SKEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SYSTEMS OF REALITY

• Autor(a) principal: Campelo, Wendel de Holanda Pereira
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Kriterion (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/32611
• topic: Ceticismo mitigado; Teoria da dupla-existência; Realismo; Hume; Mitigated skepticism; Double-existence theory; Realism; Hume

In this paper, I argue that Hume’s commitment to mindindependentobjects is based on two types of realism or system of realities: (a) anaïve realism based on an unjustified vulgar belief which identifies perceptionsand objects, and (b) a representational realism or philosophical system of doubleexistence.Firstly, I emphasize that the philosophical question “Whether therebe body or not” cannot be considered a full case of unmitigated skepticism,because Hume accepts a mitigated skepticism compatible with both vulgar andrepresentational realism. Furthermore, I argue that, while the vulgar belief inbodies is based on an unjustified assent, the double-existence theory is basedon both an unjustified assent and a rationally justified assent (that correctsthe former). Considering all these points, I conclude that Hume’s mitigatedskepticism allows and requires a belief in or supposition of continued and distinct existences, and that this must, as a practical matter, take vulgar and philosophical forms at different times.