WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Kriterion (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755 |
Resumo: | It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity. |
id |
UFMG-10_6d1b9fd6c19c48773e4a65c8ddfd9368 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/25755 |
network_acronym_str |
UFMG-10 |
network_name_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?WillgoalsmotivesdesiresincentivesIt is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2020-10-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 146 (2020)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 146 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 146 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 146 (2020)Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 146 (2020)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755/20092Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVogelmann, Rafael2020-10-16T21:57:16Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/25755Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-01-24T12:41:26.169106Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
title |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
spellingShingle |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? Vogelmann, Rafael Will goals motives desires incentives |
title_short |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
title_full |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
title_fullStr |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
title_full_unstemmed |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
title_sort |
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL? |
author |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
author_facet |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vogelmann, Rafael |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Will goals motives desires incentives |
topic |
Will goals motives desires incentives |
description |
It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-10-09 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755/20092 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion Revista Kriterion Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia Revista Kriterion |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 146 (2020) Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 146 (2020) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 146 (2020) Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 146 (2020) Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 146 (2020) 1981-5336 0100-512X reponame:Kriterion (Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Kriterion (Online) |
collection |
Kriterion (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
revistakriterion@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1788989923708108800 |