WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vogelmann, Rafael
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Kriterion (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755
Resumo: It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity.
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spelling WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?WillgoalsmotivesdesiresincentivesIt is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity.Revista KriterionRevista KriterionKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaKriterion: Revista de FilosofiaRevista Kriterion2020-10-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 146 (2020)Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 146 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 146 (2020)Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 146 (2020)Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 146 (2020)1981-53360100-512Xreponame:Kriterion (Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755/20092Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVogelmann, Rafael2020-10-16T21:57:16Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/25755Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterionPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/oairevistakriterion@gmail.com1981-53360100-512Xopendoar:2024-01-24T12:41:26.169106Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
title WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
spellingShingle WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
Vogelmann, Rafael
Will
goals
motives
desires
incentives
title_short WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
title_full WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
title_fullStr WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
title_full_unstemmed WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
title_sort WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
author Vogelmann, Rafael
author_facet Vogelmann, Rafael
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vogelmann, Rafael
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Will
goals
motives
desires
incentives
topic Will
goals
motives
desires
incentives
description It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act but in which her motive corresponds to only one of these incentives) shows this thesis to be false. In order to account for such cases we have to ascribe to agents the capacity to actively determine the goals at which their actions aim. I refer to this capacity as the agent’s “will”. Agents endowed with a will are capable not only of determining their own behavior but also their motives. I conclude that the existence of multiple-incentives cases shows that agents have this capacity.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-10-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755
url https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/kriterion/article/view/25755/20092
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion
Revista Kriterion
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Revista Kriterion
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion
Revista Kriterion
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Revista Kriterion
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 No. 146 (2020)
Revista Kriterion; Vol. 61 Núm. 146 (2020)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 61 No 146 (2020)
Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia; V. 61 N. 146 (2020)
Revista Kriterion; v. 61 n. 146 (2020)
1981-5336
0100-512X
reponame:Kriterion (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Kriterion (Online)
collection Kriterion (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Kriterion (Online) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revistakriterion@gmail.com
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