Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Islas Mondragón, Damián
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/15012
Resumo: Thought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cognitive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a “paradigmatic” thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown’s rationalism and John D. Norton’s empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.
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spelling Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought ExperimentsThought ExperimentsBack Ground knowledgeConfirmationPlausibilitySuccessThought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cognitive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a “paradigmatic” thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown’s rationalism and John D. Norton’s empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais2017-12-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/1501210.24117/2526-2270.2017.i3.06Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of ScienceTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of ScienceTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of ScienceTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of Science2526-2270reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/15012/11972Copyright (c) 2017 Damián Islas Mondragónhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessIslas Mondragón, Damián2021-07-26T19:45:42Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/15012Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/oaimauroconde@ufmg.br2526-22702526-2270opendoar:2021-07-26T19:45:42Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
title Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
spellingShingle Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
Islas Mondragón, Damián
Thought Experiments
Back Ground knowledge
Confirmation
Plausibility
Success
title_short Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
title_full Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
title_fullStr Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
title_full_unstemmed Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
title_sort Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments
author Islas Mondragón, Damián
author_facet Islas Mondragón, Damián
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Islas Mondragón, Damián
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Thought Experiments
Back Ground knowledge
Confirmation
Plausibility
Success
topic Thought Experiments
Back Ground knowledge
Confirmation
Plausibility
Success
description Thought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cognitive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a “paradigmatic” thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown’s rationalism and John D. Norton’s empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-22
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/15012
10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i3.06
url https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/15012
identifier_str_mv 10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i3.06
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/15012/11972
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Damián Islas Mondragón
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Damián Islas Mondragón
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of Science
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of Science
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of Science
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 3 (2017): For the Diversity of the Historiography of Science
2526-2270
reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron:UFMG
instname_str Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
instacron_str UFMG
institution UFMG
reponame_str Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
collection Transversal (Belo Horizonte)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mauroconde@ufmg.br
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