The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Transversal (Belo Horizonte) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130 |
Resumo: | This article evaluates Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an epistemology of psychology. Although the author admittedly neither proposes an epistemology nor examines specific issues of psychology as a science, we understand that his reflections on the meaning of psychological concepts may contribute to a better understanding of psychology as a science, which involves understanding its object and methods. With that goal in mind and based on the concept of language developed in his second phase, especially in his work Philosophical Investigations, we retrace his efforts to obtain a picture of the grammar of psychological concepts, emphasizing two of its aspects: first, the place and role of first‑person expressive propositions in the psychological language-game and second, how this understanding of the perspective of the first person implies in refusing to reduce explanations of human behavior to causal explanations in favor of explanations based on reasons. |
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The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical AnalysisWittgensteinLanguagePsychologyGrammarObjectivitySubjectivity This article evaluates Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an epistemology of psychology. Although the author admittedly neither proposes an epistemology nor examines specific issues of psychology as a science, we understand that his reflections on the meaning of psychological concepts may contribute to a better understanding of psychology as a science, which involves understanding its object and methods. With that goal in mind and based on the concept of language developed in his second phase, especially in his work Philosophical Investigations, we retrace his efforts to obtain a picture of the grammar of psychological concepts, emphasizing two of its aspects: first, the place and role of first‑person expressive propositions in the psychological language-game and second, how this understanding of the perspective of the first person implies in refusing to reduce explanations of human behavior to causal explanations in favor of explanations based on reasons. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais2021-06-17info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/3513010.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.02Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science EducationTransversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education2526-2270reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte)instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)instacron:UFMGenghttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130/27724Copyright (c) 2021 Mirian Donathttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDonat, Mirian 2021-07-26T19:46:22Zoai:periodicos.ufmg.br:article/35130Revistahttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/oaimauroconde@ufmg.br2526-22702526-2270opendoar:2021-07-26T19:46:22Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
title |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
spellingShingle |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis Donat, Mirian Wittgenstein Language Psychology Grammar Objectivity Subjectivity |
title_short |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
title_full |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
title_fullStr |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
title_sort |
The Epistemology of Psychology from a Perspective of Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis |
author |
Donat, Mirian |
author_facet |
Donat, Mirian |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Donat, Mirian |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Wittgenstein Language Psychology Grammar Objectivity Subjectivity |
topic |
Wittgenstein Language Psychology Grammar Objectivity Subjectivity |
description |
This article evaluates Wittgenstein’s possible contributions to an epistemology of psychology. Although the author admittedly neither proposes an epistemology nor examines specific issues of psychology as a science, we understand that his reflections on the meaning of psychological concepts may contribute to a better understanding of psychology as a science, which involves understanding its object and methods. With that goal in mind and based on the concept of language developed in his second phase, especially in his work Philosophical Investigations, we retrace his efforts to obtain a picture of the grammar of psychological concepts, emphasizing two of its aspects: first, the place and role of first‑person expressive propositions in the psychological language-game and second, how this understanding of the perspective of the first person implies in refusing to reduce explanations of human behavior to causal explanations in favor of explanations based on reasons. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-06-17 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130 10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.02 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.24117/2526-2270.2021.i10.02 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/transversal/article/view/35130/27724 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Mirian Donat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Mirian Donat https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; Núm. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; No 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science; n. 10 (2021): Wittgenstein and the Sciences: History and Philosophy of Science and Science Education 2526-2270 reponame:Transversal (Belo Horizonte) instname:Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) instacron:UFMG |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
instacron_str |
UFMG |
institution |
UFMG |
reponame_str |
Transversal (Belo Horizonte) |
collection |
Transversal (Belo Horizonte) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Transversal (Belo Horizonte) - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mauroconde@ufmg.br |
_version_ |
1754913651278479360 |