Montesquieu in Latin America: critique of Paolo Sandro's critique of the theory of separation of power

• Autor(a) principal: Marcolino, Danilo Sardinha
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista de Ciências do Estado (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/revice/article/view/e45375
• topic: Separation of powers; Montesquieu; Paolo Sandro; New Latin American Constitutionalism; Popular sovereignty; Separação de poderes; Montesquieu; Paolo Sandro; Novo Constitucionalismo Latino-Americano; Soberania popular; Separaci´on de poderes; Montesquieu; Paolo Sadro; Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano; Soberanía popular

The article proposes a critical analysis of the theory created by Paolo Sandro, Italian philosopher of law and author of the book “The Making of Constitutional Democracy”, in reaction to the modern theory of separation of powers, developed by Montesquieu, based on his relationship with the Latin American constitutional movement known as New Latin American Constitutionalism. The article presents the research question-problem: "Is it possible to speak of a rupture with Montesquieu's model in the experiences of the New Latin American Constitutionalism?". Thus, it works from two main hypotheses, namely: (i) the New Latin American Constitutionalism breaks with the Montesquian model of separation of powers; and (ii) it is possible to build bridges of dialogue between classical and critical Latin American theories, based on the category of popular sovereignty. The second hypothesis has the highest probability of being corroborated. The methodology used is a literary review, with keywords such as "Separation of Powers", "Montesquieu", "New Latin American Constitutionalism" and "Latin American Constitutionalism", in addition to the analysis of Paolo Sandro's book. Throughout the development and conclusions of this article, it was found in the experiences of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 and the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 the presence of quadripartite models of separation of powers, which included, respectively, the “Citizen Power” and the “Plurinational Electoral Power” as forms of institutionalization of popular power in the democratic game. Thus, it was understood by the partial rupture of the Montesquian model, bringing the people into the separation of powers.