A hermenêutica heideggeriana da facticidade como radicalização da historicidade da vida em Dilthey

• Autor(a) principal: Leite, Marcela Barbosa
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11778
• topic: Filosofia; Hermenêutica; Marti Heidegger; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

This thesis aims to examine how the historicity of Wilhelm Dilthey's life influenced the philosophical project of the young Martin Heidegger. Our hypothesis is that Dilthey - leading figure in the most prominent philosophical and scientific thinking between the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century - contributed decisively to the development of Heidgegger's "hermeneutics of facticity". We argue that Heidegger gets fundamental insights from Dilthey to rethink the theoretical link he had with Baden's neokantianism and with Husserl's phenomenology at the beginning of his academic life. Heidegger awakens, with Dilthey, to the phenomenon of life, time and history as important elements to rethink the issue of "meaning", thus widening the horizon of understanding of philosophy beyond its merely intellectual functions. Heidegger finds out that the "meaning" is not placed in an ideal universe, univocal, nor does it come from a transcendent, timeless subjectivity, but rather is the originally experienced, the factual life, singular and temporal. Dilthey's idea about life being a philosophical subject par excellence will be invaluable to Heidegger, but it can not be grasped through logical or axiological postulates established a priori. In Dilthey, we find a practical, pre-theoretical, understanding nature through which he thinks the "structure of life. For him, life is interpreted by itself as it is lived and nothing can be understood outside of it. Our thesis holds that the concept of "self-sufficiency" of life unveiled in Dilthey's philosophy, as well as the concepts of "experience", "expression" and "understanding" related to it, constitute fundamental methodological assumptions of Heidegger's "hermeneutics of factuality".