Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: França, Robério Dantas de
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Tese
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13831
Resumo: This Doctoral thesis consists of three independent essays related to the effects of corporate governance and corporate reputation on tax avoidance of Brazilian companies. This thesis seeks to contribute to the tax avoidance debate based on the argument that Brazilian companies increase tax avoidance by highlighting fiscal risks, even in the presence of Corporate Governance and corporate reputation. Agency theory and Moral License Theory was used as theoretical basis. The first theory explains the agency conflict caused by the search for agent wealth to the detriment of owner wealth, as well as the use of governance as a reduce of this conflict, and the second theory to give an alternative explanation for the fact that some companies with strong corporate reputation to engage in aggressive tax avoidance, increasing the firm's fiscal risk. The First essay assumes that Brazilian private companies are prone to present a higher level of tax avoidance in relation to Brazilian publicly held companies. Regression models were estimated with random effects panel data and fixed effects with LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables) to analyze the explanatory power of the variable of interest (private or public companies) in relation to the dependent variable (ETR), controlling by economic sectors and organizational life cycle (control variables) of 668 Brazilian firms from 2010 to 2015. The results indicate that: (i) Brazilian privately companies are prone to present lower ETRs in relation to publicly held companies; (ii) The stages of maturity and turbulence of the organizational life cycle are indirectly related to ETR. The Second essay advances in the tax avoidance analysis assuming that corporate reputation is a determinant of tax avoidance in Brazilian publicly held companies. The sample comprises 225 companies with 1,575 observations distributed in a panel data from the period (2010 to 2016). The estimations were made by panel data methods (RE, FE-LSDV, GLS, GLM, GHG and GMM) and resulting that Brazilian publicly held companies with an established corporate reputation increase their tax avoidance. This may indicate that the companies ignore possibility of fiscal risk and reputational damage which may arise, at least up to a certain level of tax aggressiveness. Finally, the Third essay assumes that managerial opportunism is encouraged by executive compensation and is mitigated by the presence of corporate governance and corporate reputation in Brazilian publicly held companies. Using GLS and GMM estimations for the determinants of tax avoidance (measured by BTD, NBTD and ABTD) it can be inferred that: (i) In an individual perspective of view, remuneration does not impact managerial opportunism; (ii) Corporate reputation can reduce managerial opportunism if analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism; (iii) In relation to corporate governance, the results were inconclusive when the governance variable is analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism.
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spelling Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no BrasilTax AvoidanceReputação corporativaGovernança corporativaRemuneração de executivosEmpresas de capital aberto e fechadoCorporate reputationCorporate governanceExecutive compensationPublicly or privately held companiesCNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEISThis Doctoral thesis consists of three independent essays related to the effects of corporate governance and corporate reputation on tax avoidance of Brazilian companies. This thesis seeks to contribute to the tax avoidance debate based on the argument that Brazilian companies increase tax avoidance by highlighting fiscal risks, even in the presence of Corporate Governance and corporate reputation. Agency theory and Moral License Theory was used as theoretical basis. The first theory explains the agency conflict caused by the search for agent wealth to the detriment of owner wealth, as well as the use of governance as a reduce of this conflict, and the second theory to give an alternative explanation for the fact that some companies with strong corporate reputation to engage in aggressive tax avoidance, increasing the firm's fiscal risk. The First essay assumes that Brazilian private companies are prone to present a higher level of tax avoidance in relation to Brazilian publicly held companies. Regression models were estimated with random effects panel data and fixed effects with LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables) to analyze the explanatory power of the variable of interest (private or public companies) in relation to the dependent variable (ETR), controlling by economic sectors and organizational life cycle (control variables) of 668 Brazilian firms from 2010 to 2015. The results indicate that: (i) Brazilian privately companies are prone to present lower ETRs in relation to publicly held companies; (ii) The stages of maturity and turbulence of the organizational life cycle are indirectly related to ETR. The Second essay advances in the tax avoidance analysis assuming that corporate reputation is a determinant of tax avoidance in Brazilian publicly held companies. The sample comprises 225 companies with 1,575 observations distributed in a panel data from the period (2010 to 2016). The estimations were made by panel data methods (RE, FE-LSDV, GLS, GLM, GHG and GMM) and resulting that Brazilian publicly held companies with an established corporate reputation increase their tax avoidance. This may indicate that the companies ignore possibility of fiscal risk and reputational damage which may arise, at least up to a certain level of tax aggressiveness. Finally, the Third essay assumes that managerial opportunism is encouraged by executive compensation and is mitigated by the presence of corporate governance and corporate reputation in Brazilian publicly held companies. Using GLS and GMM estimations for the determinants of tax avoidance (measured by BTD, NBTD and ABTD) it can be inferred that: (i) In an individual perspective of view, remuneration does not impact managerial opportunism; (ii) Corporate reputation can reduce managerial opportunism if analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism; (iii) In relation to corporate governance, the results were inconclusive when the governance variable is analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism.NenhumaEsta tese é composta por três ensaios empíricos sobre questões relativas aos efeitos da reputação corporativa e da governança na tax avoidance de empresas brasileiras. Busca-se contribuir para o debate sobre tax avoidance, partindo da argumentação de que as empresas brasileiras aumentam a tax avoidance relevando os riscos fiscais, mesmo na presença de governança e reputação corporativa forte. Vale-se da Teoria da Agência e da Teoria da Licença Moral como base teórica, a primeira, para explicar o conflito de agência ocasionado pela busca de riqueza do agente em detrimento da riqueza do proprietário, bem como o uso da governança como mitigadora deste conflito, e a segunda teoria para dar uma explicação alternativa para o fato de algumas empresas com forte reputação corporativa se envolverem em tax avoidance agressivo, aumentando o risco fiscal da firma. O primeiro artigo assume a hipótese de que empresas brasileiras de capital fechado são propensas a apresentarem um maior nível de tax avoidance em relação às de capital aberto. Foram estimados modelos de regressão com dados em painel de efeitos aleatórios e efeitos fixos com LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables) para analisar o poder explicativo da variável de interesse (empresas de capital fechado ou aberto) em relação à variável dependente (ETR), controlando por setores econômicos e ciclo de vida organizacional (variáveis de controle) de 668 firmas brasileiras no período de 2010 a 2015. Os resultados indicam que: (i) empresas brasileiras de capital fechado são propensas a apresentarem ETRs menores em relação às empresas abertas e, (ii) os estágios de maturidade e turbulência do ciclo de vida organizacional têm relação indireta com a ETR. O segundo artigo avança na análise da tax avoidance, assumindo a hipótese de que a reputação corporativa é determinante da tax avoidance de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. A amostra compreende 225 empresas com 1.575 observações distribuídas em um painel de dados que acompanha as mesmas empresas no período (2010 a 2016). As estimativas realizadas pelos métodos de dados em painel (RE, FE-LSDV, GLS, GLM, GEE e GMM) evidenciaram que as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto com reputação corporativa estabelecida aumentam seu tax avoidance. Isto pode indicar que as empresas ignoram os fatores de riscos fiscais e os danos à reputação que, porventura, venham surgir, pelo menos até determinado nível de agressividade tributária. Por fim, o terceiro artigo assume a hipótese de que oportunismo gerencial é incentivado pela remuneração variável dos executivos, sendo atenuado pela presença da governança e da reputação corporativa nas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto. Através de estimações GLS e GMM, para os determinantes da Tax Avoidance (mensurada pela BTD, NBTD e ABTD) podese inferir que: (i) quando analisada individualmente, a remuneração variável não impacta no oportunismo gerencial; (ii) a reputação corporativa consegue atenuar o oportunismo gerencial se analisada individualmente. No entanto, quando considerada sua interação com a remuneração variável, há evidências a favor de incentivos ao oportunismo gerencial; e, (iii) em relação à governança corporativa, os resultados foram inconclusivos quando a variável de governança é analisada isoladamente. No entanto, quando considerada sua interação com a remuneração variável há evidências a favor de incentivos ao oportunismo gerencial.Universidade Federal da ParaíbaBrasilFinanças e ContabilidadePrograma de Pós-Graduação em Ciências ContábeisUFPBMonte, Paulo Aguiar dohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2086894513472218França, Robério Dantas de2019-03-07T12:42:47Z2018-04-022019-03-07T12:42:47Z2018-03-21info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesishttps://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13831porAttribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazilhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/br/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPBinstname:Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)instacron:UFPB2019-03-07T12:42:47Zoai:repositorio.ufpb.br:123456789/13831Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufpb.br/PUBhttp://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/oai/requestdiretoria@ufpb.br|| diretoria@ufpb.bropendoar:2019-03-07T12:42:47Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB - Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
title Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
spellingShingle Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
França, Robério Dantas de
Tax Avoidance
Reputação corporativa
Governança corporativa
Remuneração de executivos
Empresas de capital aberto e fechado
Corporate reputation
Corporate governance
Executive compensation
Publicly or privately held companies
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS
title_short Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
title_full Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
title_fullStr Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
title_full_unstemmed Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
title_sort Ensaios sobre Tax avoidance, reputação corporativa e governança no Brasil
author França, Robério Dantas de
author_facet França, Robério Dantas de
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Monte, Paulo Aguiar do
http://lattes.cnpq.br/2086894513472218
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv França, Robério Dantas de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Tax Avoidance
Reputação corporativa
Governança corporativa
Remuneração de executivos
Empresas de capital aberto e fechado
Corporate reputation
Corporate governance
Executive compensation
Publicly or privately held companies
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS
topic Tax Avoidance
Reputação corporativa
Governança corporativa
Remuneração de executivos
Empresas de capital aberto e fechado
Corporate reputation
Corporate governance
Executive compensation
Publicly or privately held companies
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS
description This Doctoral thesis consists of three independent essays related to the effects of corporate governance and corporate reputation on tax avoidance of Brazilian companies. This thesis seeks to contribute to the tax avoidance debate based on the argument that Brazilian companies increase tax avoidance by highlighting fiscal risks, even in the presence of Corporate Governance and corporate reputation. Agency theory and Moral License Theory was used as theoretical basis. The first theory explains the agency conflict caused by the search for agent wealth to the detriment of owner wealth, as well as the use of governance as a reduce of this conflict, and the second theory to give an alternative explanation for the fact that some companies with strong corporate reputation to engage in aggressive tax avoidance, increasing the firm's fiscal risk. The First essay assumes that Brazilian private companies are prone to present a higher level of tax avoidance in relation to Brazilian publicly held companies. Regression models were estimated with random effects panel data and fixed effects with LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables) to analyze the explanatory power of the variable of interest (private or public companies) in relation to the dependent variable (ETR), controlling by economic sectors and organizational life cycle (control variables) of 668 Brazilian firms from 2010 to 2015. The results indicate that: (i) Brazilian privately companies are prone to present lower ETRs in relation to publicly held companies; (ii) The stages of maturity and turbulence of the organizational life cycle are indirectly related to ETR. The Second essay advances in the tax avoidance analysis assuming that corporate reputation is a determinant of tax avoidance in Brazilian publicly held companies. The sample comprises 225 companies with 1,575 observations distributed in a panel data from the period (2010 to 2016). The estimations were made by panel data methods (RE, FE-LSDV, GLS, GLM, GHG and GMM) and resulting that Brazilian publicly held companies with an established corporate reputation increase their tax avoidance. This may indicate that the companies ignore possibility of fiscal risk and reputational damage which may arise, at least up to a certain level of tax aggressiveness. Finally, the Third essay assumes that managerial opportunism is encouraged by executive compensation and is mitigated by the presence of corporate governance and corporate reputation in Brazilian publicly held companies. Using GLS and GMM estimations for the determinants of tax avoidance (measured by BTD, NBTD and ABTD) it can be inferred that: (i) In an individual perspective of view, remuneration does not impact managerial opportunism; (ii) Corporate reputation can reduce managerial opportunism if analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism; (iii) In relation to corporate governance, the results were inconclusive when the governance variable is analyzed individually. However, when considering its interaction with the variable remuneration there is an evidence in favor of incentives to managerial opportunism.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04-02
2018-03-21
2019-03-07T12:42:47Z
2019-03-07T12:42:47Z
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format doctoralThesis
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13831
url https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13831
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazil
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/br/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazil
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/br/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Brasil
Finanças e Contabilidade
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis
UFPB
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal da Paraíba
Brasil
Finanças e Contabilidade
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis
UFPB
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
instname:Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)
instacron:UFPB
instname_str Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)
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institution UFPB
reponame_str Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
collection Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB - Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv diretoria@ufpb.br|| diretoria@ufpb.br
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