O problema da divisão dos sujeitos e o fundamento moral da pena em Kant

• Autor(a) principal: Freitas, Rita de Cássia Souza Tabosa
• Data de Publicação: 2006
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5685
• topic: Direito; Sujeito; Lei moral; Pena; Right; Citizen; Moral law; Pain; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

To if dealing with the criminal legal philosophy in Kant, objective in this work of research, arguing the moral bedding of the penalty, from the perspective of the existence of a duality of citizens in the soul of all the human beings. Being overcome as principle with that the freedom, in Kant, if coats with autonomy, they make with that all can act as its interests, however without never being able to ignore the knowledge of the imperative of the morality, without being able to ignore the existence of its supply-sensible reality. Breaking of a bibliographical research in the Kantians workmanships on philosophy politics, one will search to show as, when dealing with criminal law, Kant it bases the severity of its proposal punitive on the existence of the moral law in the interior of all the human beings. In this study, leaving of the concept of that, in Kant, the right in sends the coercion to them exterior that we suffer to be able to act socially the law in accordance with and, the existence of the morality, also exerts on us another form of coercion: the moral coercion, that is an interior coercion and that in the punishment, before the existence of a conviction, the criminal punishes itself exactly, as a form to recoup its lost dignity in the practical undertaking of the criminal one, readjusting the criminal with its private court.