Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931
Resumo: In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.
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spelling Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel KantHumilhação da presunção e interiorização da lei moral em Immanuel KantKant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral.Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments.In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.Na Crítica da razão prática, Kant desenvolve o fundamento da lei moral em seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo. Depois de afirmar ser plausível postular a determinação da vontade tão somente por meio da razão pura em seu uso prático, foi necessário ao filósofo demonstrar como ela se torna consciente e aceitável para o agente moral.  Neste passo, ele examina o sentimento de prazer e desprazer, ao qual associa, de início, a humilhação da vontade entregue ao agrado dos sentidos, de modo que no sujeito emerge uma qualidade nova de sentimento, o respeito, também denominado de sentimento moral. A mesma estratégia encontra-se na terceira crítica, onde o constrangimento, desta vez, atua sobre a imaginação, impossibilitada de abarcar a imensidão sublime com o auxílio do entendimento. O desprazer daí proveniente conduz ao reconhecimento da razão como faculdade superior e, desta, ao prazer proveniente da consciência da lei moral como destinação superior. A considerar a forma como o subjetivo assimila a lei moral, pretende-se aqui pensá-la sob a hipótese de ser ela, antes, por meio do constrangimento e do desprazer, não apenas fundada na liberdade, mas também na humilhação da presunção. O argumento segue as obras de Kant sobre a ética, a começar pela Fundamentação da Metafísica dos costumes, em seguida, segue o caminho da segunda para a terceira crítica. Neste percurso, pretende-se examinar o lugar que o sentimento de prazer ocupa no fundamento a priori da lei moral, seja na analítica da razão prática seja na analítica do belo e do sublime.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2022-10-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/293110.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 116-1272178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931/1788Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silvahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Reginaldo Oliveira2022-10-28T21:38:11Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2931Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2022-10-28T21:38:11Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
Humilhação da presunção e interiorização da lei moral em Immanuel Kant
title Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
spellingShingle Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira
Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral.
Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments.
title_short Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
title_full Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
title_fullStr Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
title_full_unstemmed Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
title_sort Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
author Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira
author_facet Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral.
Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments.
topic Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral.
Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments.
description In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-10-28
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931
10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931/1788
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silva
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silva
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 116-127
2178-1036
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instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
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reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
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