Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931 |
Resumo: | In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime. |
id |
UFRB-4_7e1901e7759ad21c860eeae654dd9f44 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2931 |
network_acronym_str |
UFRB-4 |
network_name_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel KantHumilhação da presunção e interiorização da lei moral em Immanuel KantKant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral.Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments.In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.Na Crítica da razão prática, Kant desenvolve o fundamento da lei moral em seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo. Depois de afirmar ser plausível postular a determinação da vontade tão somente por meio da razão pura em seu uso prático, foi necessário ao filósofo demonstrar como ela se torna consciente e aceitável para o agente moral. Neste passo, ele examina o sentimento de prazer e desprazer, ao qual associa, de início, a humilhação da vontade entregue ao agrado dos sentidos, de modo que no sujeito emerge uma qualidade nova de sentimento, o respeito, também denominado de sentimento moral. A mesma estratégia encontra-se na terceira crítica, onde o constrangimento, desta vez, atua sobre a imaginação, impossibilitada de abarcar a imensidão sublime com o auxílio do entendimento. O desprazer daí proveniente conduz ao reconhecimento da razão como faculdade superior e, desta, ao prazer proveniente da consciência da lei moral como destinação superior. A considerar a forma como o subjetivo assimila a lei moral, pretende-se aqui pensá-la sob a hipótese de ser ela, antes, por meio do constrangimento e do desprazer, não apenas fundada na liberdade, mas também na humilhação da presunção. O argumento segue as obras de Kant sobre a ética, a começar pela Fundamentação da Metafísica dos costumes, em seguida, segue o caminho da segunda para a terceira crítica. Neste percurso, pretende-se examinar o lugar que o sentimento de prazer ocupa no fundamento a priori da lei moral, seja na analítica da razão prática seja na analítica do belo e do sublime.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2022-10-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/293110.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 116-1272178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931/1788Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silvahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Reginaldo Oliveira2022-10-28T21:38:11Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2931Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2022-10-28T21:38:11Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant Humilhação da presunção e interiorização da lei moral em Immanuel Kant |
title |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
spellingShingle |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral. Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments. |
title_short |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
title_full |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
title_fullStr |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
title_full_unstemmed |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
title_sort |
Humiliation of the presumption and interiorization of the moral law in Immanuel Kant |
author |
Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira |
author_facet |
Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Reginaldo Oliveira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral. Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments. |
topic |
Kant; Lei moral; Desprazer; Sublime; Sentimento moral. Kant; Moral law; Unpleasure; Sublime; Moral sentiments. |
description |
In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant’s works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-10-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931 10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v22i3.2931 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2931/1788 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silva http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Reginaldo Oliveira Silva http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 22 n. 3 (2022); 116-127 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1754732700737994752 |