Incentivos eleitorais e o gerenciamento de resultados orçamentários por meio de restos a pagar: um estudo em municípios brasileiros

• Autor(a) principal: Araújo, Ronaldo José Rêgo de
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/23382
• topic: Qualidade da informação contábil; Manipulações contábeis orçamentárias; Gerenciamento de resultados orçamentários; Accruals orçamentários; Ciclos políticos eleitorais; Accounting information quality; Budget accounting manipulations; Budget results management; Budget accruals; Political electoral cycles; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::CIENCIAS CONTABEIS

The general objective of this research was to analyze the effect of electoral political cycles on the management of budgetary results through remaining payables in Brazilian municipalities. By pointing out as on empirical-theoretical gap, the incipient quality metrics of accounting information in the governmental environment, based on Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) and Print Management (Spence, 1975). 1973), a model for estimating discretionary budget accruals was proposed. The Theory of Political Cycles (Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff, 1990) was used to justify the manager’s opportunistic cyclical behavior, due to the electoral calendar. From a sample comprising 62,1% of Brazilian municipalities, covering all regions and federal states, three hypotheses based on the literature were structured. Initially, the total budget accruals corresponding to the financial years from 2015 to 2020 were calculated. Subsequently, the variables corresponding to the manager’s normal behavior were identified. After that, discretionary budget accruals were estimated to test the manager’s particular electoral incentives against the level of estimated accruals. The results showed the presence of positive discretionary budget accruals in the years immediately prior to the democratic election - hypothesis 1 - and their reversal (negative discretionary budget accruals) opportunely in the election year - hypothesis 2 -, making up the Budget Electoral Cycle. Additionally, it was found that first-term managers are more inclined to engage in this type of practice, motivated by the chances of their reappointment to the position, regardless of their success in the election - hypothesis 3. This evidence is ratified, in view of not observance of signification levels of this practice in the second term. Such behaviors characterize the management of budgetary results by remaining payable, which negatively qualifies the quality of accounting information for failing to faithfully present information regarding budget execution to the expenses effectively executed in each year. In an incremental approach to the accounting literature, this research proposed a proxy for the quality of government accounting information and proved that earnings management, measured by discretionary budget accruals, captured through the carry-over of the remaining payable type, has cyclical behavior due to of the previously established electoral calendar.