Electoral incentives and the management of budgetary results through unpaid commitment

• Autor(a) principal: Araújo, Ronaldo José Rêgo de
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Outros Autores: Queiroz, Dimas Barrêto de, Paulo, Edilson
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/90402
• topic: quality of accounting information; budgetary accounting manipulations; budget results management; budget accruals; electoral political cycles; calidad de la información contable; manipulaciones contables presupuestarias; gestión de resultados presupuestarios; devengos presupuestarios; ciclos políticos electorales; qualidade da informação contábil; manipulações contábeis orçamentárias; gerenciamento de resultados orçamentários; accruals orçamentários; ciclos políticos eleitorais

This research aims to analyze the effect of electoral political cycles on the management of budgetary results by observing the unpaid commitments of Brazilian local governments. The study proposes a model to estimate discretionary budgetary accruals based on unpaid commitments, addressing an empirical-theoretical gap regarding incipient quality metrics of accounting information in public administration, considering the theory of agency, legitimacy, and impression management. The theory of political cycles was adopted to justify the managers’ opportunistic cyclical behavior aligned with the electoral calendar. Three hypotheses based on the literature were tested from a sample covering 62.1% of Brazilian municipalities. The results showed positive discretionary budgetary accruals in the years immediately preceding the elections and the opposite in election years (i.e., negative discretionary budgetary accruals), completing the budgetary electoral cycle. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that managers in their first term are more inclined to enter into this type of practice, motivated by the chances of being re-elected. This evidence is ratified by the absence of this practice at significant levels during the managers’ second term. This research incrementally contributes to public administration research, proposing a proxy for the quality of government accounting information. It proves that earnings management, measured by discretionary budgetary accruals, has cyclical behavior aligned with the electoral calendar.