Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB |
Texto Completo: | https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11864 |
Resumo: | The present work deals with emotions as determinant factors in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas. In fact, we can say that genuine moral dilemmas are situations of conflicts in which the same duty is required and denied because it is not possible to accomplish both, since to perform the action prescribed by one of the conflicting duties implies not to perform the other. This type of deliberation suggests an experience that cannot be satisfactorily explained within a theory of traditional moral reasoning (which holds that correct reasoning is deductive logical reasoning). However, there are other moral reasoning theories that present different points of view and take into account other elements as part of our deliberative process. For example, we have the Social Intuitionist Model of Haidt (2000), who argues that moral intuitions are the cause of our moral judgments and reasoning is a later step whose purpose is only to justify the judgments formed by intuition. We also have a theory advocated by Harman, Maison and Sinnot-Armstrong (2009), the Model of Reflective Equilibrium, which defends the idea that in our moral judgments we use both reasoning and intuitions. According to this model to arrive at a coherent moral judgment, we go through a process in which we test our intuitions against reasoning and test reasoning against our intuitions (Liao, 2010). Diverging a bit from the purely logicist strand of moral reasoning, we find the psychological theory of moral reasoning proposed by Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2008). We can say that it is a theory about moral propositions and it defends that there is no simple criterion for choosing the moral propositions among the immense range of deontic propositions. The mechanisms underlying moral emotions and judgments are independent and operate in parallel; Deontic judgments depend on inferences; And our beliefs about what is moral or not are neither complete nor consistent. From these different perspectives, through which we can understand moral reasoning, we aim to analyze to what extent these theories consider the question of moral dilemmas. Knowing that moral agents, in the face of a conflicting situation, must decide what to do, and since reason, as traditionally defined, cannot deal with contradictions, we defend the hypothesis that the emotions act as enabling elements of this kind of deliberation. This viability is manifested through the influence of emotions in the moral judgments concerning the dilemma, as well as the motivational factor that instigates the agent to act according to his deliberation. Thus, considering that our emotions are perceptions of values (Tapollet, 2000) we argue that they can be decisive in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas, from the formation of moral judgments, to the decision about what to do, as well as motivating forces that lead to action. |
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Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas moraisRaciocínio moralDilemas moraisEmoçõesDeliberação moralMotivação moralMoral reasoningMoral dilemmasEmotionsMoral deliberationMoral motivationCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAThe present work deals with emotions as determinant factors in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas. In fact, we can say that genuine moral dilemmas are situations of conflicts in which the same duty is required and denied because it is not possible to accomplish both, since to perform the action prescribed by one of the conflicting duties implies not to perform the other. This type of deliberation suggests an experience that cannot be satisfactorily explained within a theory of traditional moral reasoning (which holds that correct reasoning is deductive logical reasoning). However, there are other moral reasoning theories that present different points of view and take into account other elements as part of our deliberative process. For example, we have the Social Intuitionist Model of Haidt (2000), who argues that moral intuitions are the cause of our moral judgments and reasoning is a later step whose purpose is only to justify the judgments formed by intuition. We also have a theory advocated by Harman, Maison and Sinnot-Armstrong (2009), the Model of Reflective Equilibrium, which defends the idea that in our moral judgments we use both reasoning and intuitions. According to this model to arrive at a coherent moral judgment, we go through a process in which we test our intuitions against reasoning and test reasoning against our intuitions (Liao, 2010). Diverging a bit from the purely logicist strand of moral reasoning, we find the psychological theory of moral reasoning proposed by Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2008). We can say that it is a theory about moral propositions and it defends that there is no simple criterion for choosing the moral propositions among the immense range of deontic propositions. The mechanisms underlying moral emotions and judgments are independent and operate in parallel; Deontic judgments depend on inferences; And our beliefs about what is moral or not are neither complete nor consistent. From these different perspectives, through which we can understand moral reasoning, we aim to analyze to what extent these theories consider the question of moral dilemmas. Knowing that moral agents, in the face of a conflicting situation, must decide what to do, and since reason, as traditionally defined, cannot deal with contradictions, we defend the hypothesis that the emotions act as enabling elements of this kind of deliberation. This viability is manifested through the influence of emotions in the moral judgments concerning the dilemma, as well as the motivational factor that instigates the agent to act according to his deliberation. Thus, considering that our emotions are perceptions of values (Tapollet, 2000) we argue that they can be decisive in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas, from the formation of moral judgments, to the decision about what to do, as well as motivating forces that lead to action.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPESO presente trabalho trata das emoções enquanto instâncias determinantes na solução dos dilemas morais genuínos. Com efeito, podemos dizer que os dilemas morais genuínos são situações de conflitos nas quais o mesmo dever é requerido e negado por não ser possível realizar ambos, uma vez que realizar a ação prescrita por um dos deveres conflitantes implica em não realizar a outra. Esse tipo de deliberação sugere uma experiência que não pode ser explicada satisfatoriamente dentro de uma teoria do raciocínio moral tradicional (a qual defende que o raciocínio correto é o raciocínio lógico dedutivo). No entanto, existem outras teorias do raciocínio moral que apresentam diferentes pontos de vista e que levam em consideração outros elementos que fariam parte do nosso processo deliberativo. Assim, por exemplo, temos o Modelo Intuicionista Social de Haidt (2000), o qual defende que as intuições morais são a causa dos nossos julgamentos morais e o raciocínio é uma etapa posterior, cuja finalidade é apenas de justificar os julgamentos formados pela intuição. Temos ainda uma teoria defendida por Harman, Maison e Sinnot-Armstrong (2009), o Modelo do Equilíbrio Reflexivo, o qual defende a ideia de que, para formarmos nossos julgamentos morais, nós usamos tanto o raciocínio como as nossas intuições. De acordo com esse modelo, para chegarmos a um julgamento moral coerente, nós passamos por um processo no qual testamos nossas intuições contra o raciocínio e testamos o raciocínio contra nossas intuições (Liao, 2010). Desviando-se um pouco da vertente puramente logicista tradicionalista do raciocínio moral, encontramos a teoria psicológica do raciocínio moral proposta por Bucciarelli, Khemlani e Johnson-Laird (2008). Podemos dizer que se trata de uma teoria sobre as proposições morais e preconiza que não existe um critério simples para escolher as proposições morais dentre a imensa gama de proposições deônticas existentes; que os mecanismos subjacentes às emoções e julgamentos morais são independentes e operam em paralelo; que os julgamentos deônticos dependem de inferências; e que as nossas crenças sobre o que é ou não moral não são nem completas nem consistentes. A partir dessas diferentes perspectivas, através das quais podemos pensar o raciocínio moral, objetivamos analisar até que ponto essas teorias contemplam a questão dos dilemas morais. Sabendo que os agentes morais, em face de uma situação conflitante, precisam decidir o que fazer e, uma vez que a razão, como é tradicionalmente definida, não consegue lidar com as contradições, defendemos a hipótese de que são as emoções que atuam como elementos viabilizadores desse tipo de deliberação. Essa viabilização se manifesta através da influência das emoções nos julgamentos morais concernentes ao dilema e como o fator motivacional que instiga o agente a agir de acordo com sua deliberação. Assim, considerando que nossas emoções são percepções de valores (Tapollet, 2000) argumentamos que elas podem ser determinantes na solução dos dilemas morais genuínos, desde a formação dos julgamentos morais, passando pela decisão sobre o que fazer, e, finalmente, como elas são forças motivadoras que nos conduzem à ação.Universidade Federal da ParaíbaBrasilFilosofiaPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaUFPBPequeno, Marconi José Pimentelhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5979819304409879Barroso, Cícero Antônio Cavalcantehttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2374661173013073Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro2018-10-03T12:24:34Z2018-10-032018-10-03T12:24:34Z2017-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesishttps://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11864porAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazilhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPBinstname:Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)instacron:UFPB2018-10-04T06:01:00Zoai:repositorio.ufpb.br:123456789/11864Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufpb.br/PUBhttp://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/oai/requestdiretoria@ufpb.br|| diretoria@ufpb.bropendoar:2018-10-04T06:01Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB - Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
title |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
spellingShingle |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro Raciocínio moral Dilemas morais Emoções Deliberação moral Motivação moral Moral reasoning Moral dilemmas Emotions Moral deliberation Moral motivation CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
title_full |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
title_fullStr |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
title_full_unstemmed |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
title_sort |
Sobre a determinação das emocões na resolução dos dilemas morais |
author |
Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro |
author_facet |
Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Pequeno, Marconi José Pimentel http://lattes.cnpq.br/5979819304409879 Barroso, Cícero Antônio Cavalcante http://lattes.cnpq.br/2374661173013073 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Teles, Eugênia Ribeiro |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Raciocínio moral Dilemas morais Emoções Deliberação moral Motivação moral Moral reasoning Moral dilemmas Emotions Moral deliberation Moral motivation CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Raciocínio moral Dilemas morais Emoções Deliberação moral Motivação moral Moral reasoning Moral dilemmas Emotions Moral deliberation Moral motivation CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
The present work deals with emotions as determinant factors in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas. In fact, we can say that genuine moral dilemmas are situations of conflicts in which the same duty is required and denied because it is not possible to accomplish both, since to perform the action prescribed by one of the conflicting duties implies not to perform the other. This type of deliberation suggests an experience that cannot be satisfactorily explained within a theory of traditional moral reasoning (which holds that correct reasoning is deductive logical reasoning). However, there are other moral reasoning theories that present different points of view and take into account other elements as part of our deliberative process. For example, we have the Social Intuitionist Model of Haidt (2000), who argues that moral intuitions are the cause of our moral judgments and reasoning is a later step whose purpose is only to justify the judgments formed by intuition. We also have a theory advocated by Harman, Maison and Sinnot-Armstrong (2009), the Model of Reflective Equilibrium, which defends the idea that in our moral judgments we use both reasoning and intuitions. According to this model to arrive at a coherent moral judgment, we go through a process in which we test our intuitions against reasoning and test reasoning against our intuitions (Liao, 2010). Diverging a bit from the purely logicist strand of moral reasoning, we find the psychological theory of moral reasoning proposed by Bucciarelli, Khemlani and Johnson-Laird (2008). We can say that it is a theory about moral propositions and it defends that there is no simple criterion for choosing the moral propositions among the immense range of deontic propositions. The mechanisms underlying moral emotions and judgments are independent and operate in parallel; Deontic judgments depend on inferences; And our beliefs about what is moral or not are neither complete nor consistent. From these different perspectives, through which we can understand moral reasoning, we aim to analyze to what extent these theories consider the question of moral dilemmas. Knowing that moral agents, in the face of a conflicting situation, must decide what to do, and since reason, as traditionally defined, cannot deal with contradictions, we defend the hypothesis that the emotions act as enabling elements of this kind of deliberation. This viability is manifested through the influence of emotions in the moral judgments concerning the dilemma, as well as the motivational factor that instigates the agent to act according to his deliberation. Thus, considering that our emotions are perceptions of values (Tapollet, 2000) we argue that they can be decisive in the solution of genuine moral dilemmas, from the formation of moral judgments, to the decision about what to do, as well as motivating forces that lead to action. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-10-31 2018-10-03T12:24:34Z 2018-10-03 2018-10-03T12:24:34Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11864 |
url |
https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/11864 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazil http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Brazil http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/br/ |
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openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal da Paraíba Brasil Filosofia Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia UFPB |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal da Paraíba Brasil Filosofia Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia UFPB |
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reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB instname:Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB) instacron:UFPB |
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Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB) |
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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB |
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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB |
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Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFPB - Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB) |
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