Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
Texto Completo: | https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125 |
Resumo: | In this essay I examine the different views that Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty hold on the phenomenological relevance of Gestalt psychology. Against Husserl’s dismissal of the latter on the grounds of its purported “naturalism,” they each claim that the Gestaltist critique of psychological atomism releases a transcendental perspective in the study of perception. However, they find themselves in disagreement as to what phenomenological status should be granted the transcendental nature of the Gestalt. I argue that the central point of contention revolves around the application of the eidetic method of Husserl. Whereas for Gurwitsch in-vestigations pursued in line with Gestalt theory turn out to be noematic analyses, confronting the subject with ideal unities disclosed in eidetic assertions, Merleau-Ponty is critical of this identification, as it seems to him to imply a form of dualism. I conclude by critically con-fronting Gurwitsch’s reading of Gestalt theory with that of Merleau-Ponty, emphasizing the originality of the French philosopher’s characterization of the Gestalt as an originary figure of preobjective being. |
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Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-PontyTeoría de la Gestalt y método fenomenológico en Gurwitsch y Merleau-PontyTeoria Gestalt e método fenomenológico em Gurwitsch e Merleau-PontyGestaltPsicologiaFenomenologiaGurwitschMerleau-PontyGestaltPsychologyPhenomenologyGurwitschMerleau-PontyGestaltPsicologíaFenomenologíaGurwitschMerleau-PontyIn this essay I examine the different views that Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty hold on the phenomenological relevance of Gestalt psychology. Against Husserl’s dismissal of the latter on the grounds of its purported “naturalism,” they each claim that the Gestaltist critique of psychological atomism releases a transcendental perspective in the study of perception. However, they find themselves in disagreement as to what phenomenological status should be granted the transcendental nature of the Gestalt. I argue that the central point of contention revolves around the application of the eidetic method of Husserl. Whereas for Gurwitsch in-vestigations pursued in line with Gestalt theory turn out to be noematic analyses, confronting the subject with ideal unities disclosed in eidetic assertions, Merleau-Ponty is critical of this identification, as it seems to him to imply a form of dualism. I conclude by critically con-fronting Gurwitsch’s reading of Gestalt theory with that of Merleau-Ponty, emphasizing the originality of the French philosopher’s characterization of the Gestalt as an originary figure of preobjective being.En este ensayo examino las diferentes visiones que Gurwitsch y Merleau-Ponty mantienen sobre la relevancia fenomenológica de la psicología de la Gestalt. Frente al rechazo de Husserl de esta última por su supuesto “naturalismo,” cada uno de ellos afirma que la crítica gestaltista del atomismo psicológico libera una perspectiva trascendental en el estudio de la percepción. Sin embargo, se encuentran en desacuerdo en cuanto al estatus fenomenológico que debe otorgarse a la naturaleza trascendental de la Gestalt. Sostengo que el punto central de la discordia gira en torno a la aplicación del método eidético de Husserl. Mientras que para Gurwitsch las investigaciones llevadas a cabo de acuerdo con la teoría de la Gestalt resultan ser análisis noemáticos, que confrontan al sujeto con unidades ideales reveladas en aserciones eidéticas, Merleau-Ponty es crítico de esta identificación, ya que le parece que implica una forma de dualismo. Concluyo confrontando críticamente la lectura que hace Gurwitsch de la teoría de la Gestalt con la de Merleau-Ponty, destacando la originalidad de la caracterización que hace el filósofo francés de la Gestalt como figura originaria del ser preobjetivo.Neste ensaio, examino as diferentes visões que Gurwitsch e Merleau-Ponty susten-tam sobre a relevância fenomenológica da psicologia da Gestalt. Contra a recusa husserliana desta última em razão de seu suposto “naturalismo,” ambos defendem que a crítica da Gestalt ao atomismo psicológico libera uma perspectiva transcendental no estudo da percepção. En-tretanto, os dois discordam entre si no que diz respeito a qual estatuto fenomenológico deve ser concedido à natureza transcendental da Gestalt. Defendo que o ponto central da diver-gência gira em torno da aplicação do método eidético de Husserl. Enquanto para Gurwitsch as investigações realizadas em linha com a teoria da Gestalt se revelam análises noemáticas, confrontando o sujeito com unidades ideais expressas em asserções eidéticas, Merleau-Ponty é crítico dessa investigação, que lhe parece implicar uma forma de dualismo. Concluo com uma confrontação crítica da leitura que Gurwitsch faz da teoria da Gestalt com aquela feita por Merleau-Ponty, enfatizando a originalidade da caracterização da Gestalt pelo filósofo francês como figura originária do ser pré-objetivo.Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno)2022-06-22info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-228Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 Núm. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-228Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; v. 2 n. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-2282675-4673reponame:Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciencesinstname:Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR)instacron:UFPRenghttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125/76Copyright (c) 2022 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciencesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLind, Erik2024-04-15T18:43:07Zoai:phenomenology.com.br:article/125Revistahttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phePUBhttps://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/index/oaicontato@phenomenology.com.br || aholanda@yahoo.com2675-46732675-4673opendoar:2024-04-15T18:43:07Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences - Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty Teoría de la Gestalt y método fenomenológico en Gurwitsch y Merleau-Ponty Teoria Gestalt e método fenomenológico em Gurwitsch e Merleau-Ponty |
title |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
spellingShingle |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty Lind, Erik Gestalt Psicologia Fenomenologia Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psychology Phenomenology Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psicología Fenomenología Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty |
title_short |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
title_full |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
title_fullStr |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
title_full_unstemmed |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
title_sort |
Gestalt theory and phenomenological method in Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty |
author |
Lind, Erik |
author_facet |
Lind, Erik |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lind, Erik |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Gestalt Psicologia Fenomenologia Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psychology Phenomenology Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psicología Fenomenología Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty |
topic |
Gestalt Psicologia Fenomenologia Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psychology Phenomenology Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty Gestalt Psicología Fenomenología Gurwitsch Merleau-Ponty |
description |
In this essay I examine the different views that Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty hold on the phenomenological relevance of Gestalt psychology. Against Husserl’s dismissal of the latter on the grounds of its purported “naturalism,” they each claim that the Gestaltist critique of psychological atomism releases a transcendental perspective in the study of perception. However, they find themselves in disagreement as to what phenomenological status should be granted the transcendental nature of the Gestalt. I argue that the central point of contention revolves around the application of the eidetic method of Husserl. Whereas for Gurwitsch in-vestigations pursued in line with Gestalt theory turn out to be noematic analyses, confronting the subject with ideal unities disclosed in eidetic assertions, Merleau-Ponty is critical of this identification, as it seems to him to imply a form of dualism. I conclude by critically con-fronting Gurwitsch’s reading of Gestalt theory with that of Merleau-Ponty, emphasizing the originality of the French philosopher’s characterization of the Gestalt as an originary figure of preobjective being. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-06-22 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto Texto info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125 |
url |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://phenomenology.com.br/index.php/phe/article/view/125/76 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Associação de Pesquisas em Fenomenologia (APFeno) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 No. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-228 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; Vol. 2 Núm. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-228 Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences; v. 2 n. 2 (2021): Dossiê Especial Aron Gurwitsch; 216-228 2675-4673 reponame:Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences instname:Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) instacron:UFPR |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
instacron_str |
UFPR |
institution |
UFPR |
reponame_str |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
collection |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Phenomenology, Humanities and Sciences - Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
contato@phenomenology.com.br || aholanda@yahoo.com |
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