Skepticism and epistemic principles
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/520 |
Resumo: | The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like “here is a hand”, and sk for any incompatible proposition, such as "I'm being deceived by a genius that leads me to believe in things that do not exist", the canonical argument for academic skepticism can be formalized as follows: (1) If S can be justified in believing that p, then S can be justified in believing that ~sk, (2) S cannot be justified in believing that ~sk , then (3) S cannot be justified in believing that p. Implicitly, the skeptic argues that an epistemic relation with respect to a proposition should be preserved with the propositions it entails, and once this requirement fails to be met skepticism is the inescapable answer. In order to solve this issue, some philosophers have rejected skepticism by denying the first premise. Others, like Klein, grant (1) to the skeptic, but deny its conclusion, arguing that there is no good reason to accept (2). This paper discusses the feasibility of these alternatives. |
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Skepticism and epistemic principlesCeticismo e princípios epistêmicosCeticismo; Conhecimento; Justificação; Fechamento epistêmico.Skepticism; Knowledge; Justification; Epistemic closure.The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like “here is a hand”, and sk for any incompatible proposition, such as "I'm being deceived by a genius that leads me to believe in things that do not exist", the canonical argument for academic skepticism can be formalized as follows: (1) If S can be justified in believing that p, then S can be justified in believing that ~sk, (2) S cannot be justified in believing that ~sk , then (3) S cannot be justified in believing that p. Implicitly, the skeptic argues that an epistemic relation with respect to a proposition should be preserved with the propositions it entails, and once this requirement fails to be met skepticism is the inescapable answer. In order to solve this issue, some philosophers have rejected skepticism by denying the first premise. Others, like Klein, grant (1) to the skeptic, but deny its conclusion, arguing that there is no good reason to accept (2). This paper discusses the feasibility of these alternatives.A identificação e análise de princípios epistêmicos têm possibilitado ganhos significativos no estudo do ceticismo nas últimas décadas, isso não significa que estejamos próximos de um consenso sobre quais princípios devem ser aceitos. Entendendo p como qualquer proposição que geralmente admitiríamos saber, como “aqui há uma mão”, e sk como alguma proposição incompatível, como “estou sendo enganado por um gênio que me induz a crer em coisas que não existem”, o argumento canônico para o ceticismo acadêmico pode assim ser formalizado: (1) Se S está justificado ao crer que p, então S está justificado ao crer que ~sk; (2) S não está justificado ao crer que ~sk, logo, (3) S não está justificado ao crer que p. Implicitamente, pode-se notar: o cético advoga que a relação epistêmica tida com uma proposição deve ser preservada nas proposições decorrentes dessa e, uma vez falho o cumprimento dessa exigência, resulta-se inescapavelmente no ceticismo. Para resolver essa questão, alguns filósofos rejeitaram o ceticismo negando a premissa (1). Outros, como Klein, concedem (1) ao cético, porém negam sua conclusão, apontando que este falha em sua defesa de (2). Discute-se aqui a viabilidade dessas alternativas.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2012-06-14info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/52010.31977/grirfi.v5i1.520Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 5 n. 1 (2012); 56-662178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/520/241Copyright (c) 2012 Fernando Henrique Faustini Zarthinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessZarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini2020-06-30T18:20:27Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/520Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2020-06-30T18:20:27Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Skepticism and epistemic principles Ceticismo e princípios epistêmicos |
title |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
spellingShingle |
Skepticism and epistemic principles Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini Ceticismo; Conhecimento; Justificação; Fechamento epistêmico. Skepticism; Knowledge; Justification; Epistemic closure. |
title_short |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
title_full |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
title_fullStr |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
title_full_unstemmed |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
title_sort |
Skepticism and epistemic principles |
author |
Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini |
author_facet |
Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Zarth, Fernando Henrique Faustini |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ceticismo; Conhecimento; Justificação; Fechamento epistêmico. Skepticism; Knowledge; Justification; Epistemic closure. |
topic |
Ceticismo; Conhecimento; Justificação; Fechamento epistêmico. Skepticism; Knowledge; Justification; Epistemic closure. |
description |
The identification and analysis of epistemic principles have enabled significant gains in the study of skepticism in recent decades; this does not mean that we are near a consensus about which principles should be accepted. Taking p for any proposition that we normally accept to be known, like “here is a hand”, and sk for any incompatible proposition, such as "I'm being deceived by a genius that leads me to believe in things that do not exist", the canonical argument for academic skepticism can be formalized as follows: (1) If S can be justified in believing that p, then S can be justified in believing that ~sk, (2) S cannot be justified in believing that ~sk , then (3) S cannot be justified in believing that p. Implicitly, the skeptic argues that an epistemic relation with respect to a proposition should be preserved with the propositions it entails, and once this requirement fails to be met skepticism is the inescapable answer. In order to solve this issue, some philosophers have rejected skepticism by denying the first premise. Others, like Klein, grant (1) to the skeptic, but deny its conclusion, arguing that there is no good reason to accept (2). This paper discusses the feasibility of these alternatives. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-06-14 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/520 10.31977/grirfi.v5i1.520 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/520 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v5i1.520 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/520/241 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 Fernando Henrique Faustini Zarth info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2012 Fernando Henrique Faustini Zarth |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 5 n. 1 (2012); 56-66 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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