Is Jesse Prinz's theory of constructive sentimentalism really constructive?

• Autor(a) principal: Dalsotto, Lucas Mateus
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
• Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/635
• topic: Construtivismo; Sentimentalismo construtivo; Jesse Prinz.; Constructivism; Sentimentality constructive; Jesse Prinz

Recently, the constructivist position in metaethics has attracted and inspired a number of comments, both those who share its main thesis and see it with enthusiasm, as those who see it with some skepticism. One of the important constructivist theories in this area is that of Jesse Prinz. The central thesis of the author is that if morality depends on feelings, then it is a building, and if it is a building, then it can vary across time and space. The theory of constructive emotionalism, so called Prinz relies on two key assumptions which are a basis for the other. The first idea is that the feelings are the basis for all value judgments that are made ​​and that these values ​​can be studied historically and anthropologically to explain why some of them persist and because others have disappeared. The second idea is that feelings create the moral, and that moral systems can be created in space and time in different ways. Thus, the problem of work to be explored in this paper is to verify to what extent the theory Prinz agrees with the main theses of other constructivist theories and this is not the case, why she does not.