Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2383 |
Resumo: | The present work addresses the relationship between the notions of reason (Vernunft) and impulse (Triebe) in Max Horkheimer. We will focus on the analysis of two texts from the 1930s to point out that the philosopher rejects the idea -typical of what he considers the bourgeois conception of reason- of a radical opposition between these concepts, since it is on its behalf that a repression of the impulsive is ussually carried in the name of an optimization of thought. Horkheimer understands that while such repression seeks to emancipate reason from its other, it produces, in fact, nothing more than an atrophy of thought. We will point out that, according to Horkheimer, the radical opposition is false for two reasons: on the one hand, because reason becomes impulsive when she limits herself to reasoning. On the other hand, because without a conscious connection between reason and impulse, reason becomes prey of irrationality. We argue that there is in Horkheimer a materialist conception of the relationship between the notions of drives and reason, according to which only the establishment of a conscious relationship between the two, which does not neglect the satisfaction of impulsive demands, can prevent thinking from becoming irrational. |
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Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reasonLos impulsos en la concepción materialista de la razón de Max HorkheimerMax Horkheimer; Impulses; Reason; Materialism; Critical Theory.Max Horkheimer; Impulsos; Razón; Materialismo; Teoría Crítica.The present work addresses the relationship between the notions of reason (Vernunft) and impulse (Triebe) in Max Horkheimer. We will focus on the analysis of two texts from the 1930s to point out that the philosopher rejects the idea -typical of what he considers the bourgeois conception of reason- of a radical opposition between these concepts, since it is on its behalf that a repression of the impulsive is ussually carried in the name of an optimization of thought. Horkheimer understands that while such repression seeks to emancipate reason from its other, it produces, in fact, nothing more than an atrophy of thought. We will point out that, according to Horkheimer, the radical opposition is false for two reasons: on the one hand, because reason becomes impulsive when she limits herself to reasoning. On the other hand, because without a conscious connection between reason and impulse, reason becomes prey of irrationality. We argue that there is in Horkheimer a materialist conception of the relationship between the notions of drives and reason, according to which only the establishment of a conscious relationship between the two, which does not neglect the satisfaction of impulsive demands, can prevent thinking from becoming irrational.El presente trabajo aborda la relación entre la noción de razón (Vernunft) y la de impulsos (Triebe) en Max Horkheimer. Nos centraremos principalmente en el análisis de dos de sus artículos de la década de 1930 para señalar que el filósofo rechaza la idea -propia de la concepción burguesa de razón- según la cual razón e impulsos son radicalmente opuestos entre sí, ya que mediante ella se suele fundamentar la represión de lo impulsivo en nombre de una optimización del pensamiento. Horkheimer entiende que mientras tal represión pretende emancipar a la razón respecto de lo otro de ella, en realidad no hace más que producir una atrofia del pensamiento. Nos proponemos demostrar que Horkheimer concibe a esa oposición radical como falsa por dos motivos: por un lado, por el hecho de que la razón misma adquiere un comportamiento impulsivo cuando se identifica con el pensamiento y busca reprimir todo lo que considera distinto de él. Por otro lado, porque sin un vínculo consciente de la razón con lo impulsivo, ella queda presa de la irracionalidad. Sostenemos que hay en Horkheimer una concepción materialista de la relación entre las nociones de impulsos y razón, según la cual sólo el establecimiento de una relación consciente entre ambos, que no descuide la satisfacción de las demandas impulsivas, puede evitar que el pensamiento se torne irracional.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2021-06-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/238310.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2383Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 177-1902178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2383/1334Copyright (c) 2021 Paula García Cherephttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGarcía Cherep, Paula2021-06-11T13:38:26Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2383Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2021-06-11T13:38:26Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason Los impulsos en la concepción materialista de la razón de Max Horkheimer |
title |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
spellingShingle |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason García Cherep, Paula Max Horkheimer; Impulses; Reason; Materialism; Critical Theory. Max Horkheimer; Impulsos; Razón; Materialismo; Teoría Crítica. |
title_short |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
title_full |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
title_fullStr |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
title_full_unstemmed |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
title_sort |
Impulses in Horkheimer´s materialist notion of reason |
author |
García Cherep, Paula |
author_facet |
García Cherep, Paula |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
García Cherep, Paula |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Max Horkheimer; Impulses; Reason; Materialism; Critical Theory. Max Horkheimer; Impulsos; Razón; Materialismo; Teoría Crítica. |
topic |
Max Horkheimer; Impulses; Reason; Materialism; Critical Theory. Max Horkheimer; Impulsos; Razón; Materialismo; Teoría Crítica. |
description |
The present work addresses the relationship between the notions of reason (Vernunft) and impulse (Triebe) in Max Horkheimer. We will focus on the analysis of two texts from the 1930s to point out that the philosopher rejects the idea -typical of what he considers the bourgeois conception of reason- of a radical opposition between these concepts, since it is on its behalf that a repression of the impulsive is ussually carried in the name of an optimization of thought. Horkheimer understands that while such repression seeks to emancipate reason from its other, it produces, in fact, nothing more than an atrophy of thought. We will point out that, according to Horkheimer, the radical opposition is false for two reasons: on the one hand, because reason becomes impulsive when she limits herself to reasoning. On the other hand, because without a conscious connection between reason and impulse, reason becomes prey of irrationality. We argue that there is in Horkheimer a materialist conception of the relationship between the notions of drives and reason, according to which only the establishment of a conscious relationship between the two, which does not neglect the satisfaction of impulsive demands, can prevent thinking from becoming irrational. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-06-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2383 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2383 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2383 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2383 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2383/1334 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Paula García Cherep http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Paula García Cherep http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 177-190 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
collection |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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