The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Christiansen, María
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Griot : Revista de Filosofia
DOI: 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323
Texto Completo: http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323
Resumo: This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.
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spelling The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussionLa ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal GaslightingEpistemicidioInjusticia EpistémicaFalibilismoInfalibilismoDesacuerdo ProfundoDeep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.En este artículo se aborda el tema del conflicto social desde la epistemología de los “desacuerdos profundos”. A diferencia de otros tipos de desacuerdos, los profundos generan inconmensurabilidad y no pueden ser subsanados a través de la argumentación racional, precisamente porque ésta puede amplificar el desacuerdo y agudizar el problema. En la base de estas divergencias subyacen dos posicionamientos epistemológicos irreconciliables: el infalibilismo y el falibilismo. El estilo de argumentación infalibilista se encarna en los intentos por hallar la verdad objetiva mediante evidencia última y concluyente. Tal postura induce a defender las propias creencias a través de ciclos viciosos que Carlos Pereda ha denominado “vértigos argumentales”, generando sobre el interlocutor distintas estrategias de silenciamiento y devaluación basadas en prejuicios identitarios (una suerte de “agravio” que, en palabras de Miranda Fricker, constituye un acto de “injusticia epistémica”). La argumentación vertiginosa puede incluso propiciar una aniquilación epistémica del Otro como interlocutor válido. Este fenómeno es presentado como “epistemicidio” (adaptado del sociólogo portugués Boaventura de Sousa Santos). En este trabajo, el análisis de las fricciones, tensiones y disputas que se pueden activar en el transcurso de la producción y validación de conocimiento es llevado más lejos, para sondear las condiciones bajo las cuales puede ocurrir que la devaluación y aniquilación lleguen a ser perpetradas contra sí mismo. Denomino a este fenómeno “autoepistemicidio”, y trazo una comparación entre dicho concepto y su concomitante en el ámbito clínico: el de “Gaslighting”. Finalmente, extraigo las reflexiones más importantes del artículo, abriendo nuevos horizontes de investigación futura.En este artículo se aborda el tema del conflicto social desde la epistemología de los “desacuerdos profundos”. A diferencia de otros tipos de desacuerdos, los profundos generan inconmensurabilidad y no pueden ser subsanados a través de la argumentación racional, precisamente porque ésta puede amplificar el desacuerdo y agudizar el problema. En la base de estas divergencias subyacen dos posicionamientos epistemológicos irreconciliables: el infalibilismo y el falibilismo. El estilo de argumentación infalibilista se encarna en los intentos por hallar la verdad objetiva mediante evidencia última y concluyente. Tal postura induce a defender las propias creencias a través de ciclos viciosos que Carlos Pereda ha denominado “vértigos argumentales”, generando sobre el interlocutor distintas estrategias de silenciamiento y devaluación basadas en prejuicios identitarios (una suerte de “agravio” que, en palabras de Miranda Fricker, constituye un acto de “injusticia epistémica”). La argumentación vertiginosa puede incluso propiciar una aniquilación epistémica del Otro como interlocutor válido. Este fenómeno es presentado como “epistemicidio” (adaptado del sociólogo portugués Boaventura de Sousa Santos). En este trabajo, el análisis de las fricciones, tensiones y disputas que se pueden activar en el transcurso de la producción y validación de conocimiento es llevado más lejos, para sondear las condiciones bajo las cuales puede ocurrir que la devaluación y aniquilación lleguen a ser perpetradas contra sí mismo. Denomino a este fenómeno “autoepistemicidio”, y trazo una comparación entre dicho concepto y su concomitante en el ámbito clínico: el de “Gaslighting”. Finalmente, extraigo las reflexiones más importantes del artículo, abriendo nuevos horizontes de investigación futura.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2021-06-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/232310.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 376-3942178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323/1322InternacionalCopyright (c) 2021 María Christiansenhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChristiansen, María2021-06-11T13:38:26Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2323Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2021-06-11T13:38:26Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal
La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal
title The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
spellingShingle The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
Christiansen, María
Gaslighting
Epistemicidio
Injusticia Epistémica
Falibilismo
Infalibilismo
Desacuerdo Profundo
Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.
Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.
Christiansen, María
Gaslighting
Epistemicidio
Injusticia Epistémica
Falibilismo
Infalibilismo
Desacuerdo Profundo
Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.
Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.
title_short The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
title_full The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
title_fullStr The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
title_full_unstemmed The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
title_sort The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
author Christiansen, María
author_facet Christiansen, María
Christiansen, María
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Christiansen, María
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Gaslighting
Epistemicidio
Injusticia Epistémica
Falibilismo
Infalibilismo
Desacuerdo Profundo
Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.
Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.
topic Gaslighting
Epistemicidio
Injusticia Epistémica
Falibilismo
Infalibilismo
Desacuerdo Profundo
Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.
Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.
description This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-06-02
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-Reviewed
Evaluados por los pares
Avaliados pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323
10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323
url http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323
identifier_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323/1322
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 María Christiansen
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 María Christiansen
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Internacional
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 376-394
2178-1036
reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia
instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron:UFRB
instname_str Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
instacron_str UFRB
institution UFRB
reponame_str Griot : Revista de Filosofia
collection Griot : Revista de Filosofia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||griotrevista@gmail.com
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323