The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
DOI: | 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323 |
Texto Completo: | http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323 |
Resumo: | This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research. |
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Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
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The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussionLa ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal GaslightingEpistemicidioInjusticia EpistémicaFalibilismoInfalibilismoDesacuerdo ProfundoDeep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting.Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting.This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research.En este artículo se aborda el tema del conflicto social desde la epistemología de los “desacuerdos profundos”. A diferencia de otros tipos de desacuerdos, los profundos generan inconmensurabilidad y no pueden ser subsanados a través de la argumentación racional, precisamente porque ésta puede amplificar el desacuerdo y agudizar el problema. En la base de estas divergencias subyacen dos posicionamientos epistemológicos irreconciliables: el infalibilismo y el falibilismo. El estilo de argumentación infalibilista se encarna en los intentos por hallar la verdad objetiva mediante evidencia última y concluyente. Tal postura induce a defender las propias creencias a través de ciclos viciosos que Carlos Pereda ha denominado “vértigos argumentales”, generando sobre el interlocutor distintas estrategias de silenciamiento y devaluación basadas en prejuicios identitarios (una suerte de “agravio” que, en palabras de Miranda Fricker, constituye un acto de “injusticia epistémica”). La argumentación vertiginosa puede incluso propiciar una aniquilación epistémica del Otro como interlocutor válido. Este fenómeno es presentado como “epistemicidio” (adaptado del sociólogo portugués Boaventura de Sousa Santos). En este trabajo, el análisis de las fricciones, tensiones y disputas que se pueden activar en el transcurso de la producción y validación de conocimiento es llevado más lejos, para sondear las condiciones bajo las cuales puede ocurrir que la devaluación y aniquilación lleguen a ser perpetradas contra sí mismo. Denomino a este fenómeno “autoepistemicidio”, y trazo una comparación entre dicho concepto y su concomitante en el ámbito clínico: el de “Gaslighting”. Finalmente, extraigo las reflexiones más importantes del artículo, abriendo nuevos horizontes de investigación futura.En este artículo se aborda el tema del conflicto social desde la epistemología de los “desacuerdos profundos”. A diferencia de otros tipos de desacuerdos, los profundos generan inconmensurabilidad y no pueden ser subsanados a través de la argumentación racional, precisamente porque ésta puede amplificar el desacuerdo y agudizar el problema. En la base de estas divergencias subyacen dos posicionamientos epistemológicos irreconciliables: el infalibilismo y el falibilismo. El estilo de argumentación infalibilista se encarna en los intentos por hallar la verdad objetiva mediante evidencia última y concluyente. Tal postura induce a defender las propias creencias a través de ciclos viciosos que Carlos Pereda ha denominado “vértigos argumentales”, generando sobre el interlocutor distintas estrategias de silenciamiento y devaluación basadas en prejuicios identitarios (una suerte de “agravio” que, en palabras de Miranda Fricker, constituye un acto de “injusticia epistémica”). La argumentación vertiginosa puede incluso propiciar una aniquilación epistémica del Otro como interlocutor válido. Este fenómeno es presentado como “epistemicidio” (adaptado del sociólogo portugués Boaventura de Sousa Santos). En este trabajo, el análisis de las fricciones, tensiones y disputas que se pueden activar en el transcurso de la producción y validación de conocimiento es llevado más lejos, para sondear las condiciones bajo las cuales puede ocurrir que la devaluación y aniquilación lleguen a ser perpetradas contra sí mismo. Denomino a este fenómeno “autoepistemicidio”, y trazo una comparación entre dicho concepto y su concomitante en el ámbito clínico: el de “Gaslighting”. Finalmente, extraigo las reflexiones más importantes del artículo, abriendo nuevos horizontes de investigación futura.Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia2021-06-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-ReviewedEvaluados por los paresAvaliados pelos paresapplication/pdfhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/232310.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 376-3942178-1036reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofiainstname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)instacron:UFRBporhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323/1322InternacionalCopyright (c) 2021 María Christiansenhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChristiansen, María2021-06-11T13:38:26Zoai:seer.www.ufrb.edu.br:article/2323Revistahttp://www.ufrb.edu.br/griot/PUBhttp://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/oai||griotrevista@gmail.com2178-10362178-1036opendoar:2021-06-11T13:38:26Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal La ecología epistémica del desacuerdo profundo: un análisis reflexivo sobre la discusión interpersonal |
title |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
spellingShingle |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion Christiansen, María Gaslighting Epistemicidio Injusticia Epistémica Falibilismo Infalibilismo Desacuerdo Profundo Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting. Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting. Christiansen, María Gaslighting Epistemicidio Injusticia Epistémica Falibilismo Infalibilismo Desacuerdo Profundo Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting. Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting. |
title_short |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
title_full |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
title_fullStr |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
title_full_unstemmed |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
title_sort |
The epistemic ecology of deep disagreement: a reflective analysis of interpersonal discussion |
author |
Christiansen, María |
author_facet |
Christiansen, María Christiansen, María |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Christiansen, María |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Gaslighting Epistemicidio Injusticia Epistémica Falibilismo Infalibilismo Desacuerdo Profundo Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting. Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting. |
topic |
Gaslighting Epistemicidio Injusticia Epistémica Falibilismo Infalibilismo Desacuerdo Profundo Deep Disagreement; Infallibilism; Fallibilism; Epistemic Injustice; Epistemicide; Gaslighting. Desacuerdo Profundo; Infalibilismo; Falibilismo; Injusticia Epistémica; Epistemicidio; Gaslighting. |
description |
This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices (a kind of "grievance" that, in Miranda's words Fricker, constitutes an act of "epistemic injustice"). Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide" (adapted from the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos). In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-06-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-Reviewed Evaluados por los pares Avaliados pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323 10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323 |
url |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.ufrb.edu.br/seer/index.php/griot/article/view/2323/1322 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 María Christiansen http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 María Christiansen http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Internacional |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia; v. 21 n. 2 (2021); 376-394 2178-1036 reponame:Griot : Revista de Filosofia instname:Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) instacron:UFRB |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
instacron_str |
UFRB |
institution |
UFRB |
reponame_str |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
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Griot : Revista de Filosofia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Griot : Revista de Filosofia - Universidade Federal do Recôncavo na Bahia (UFRB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||griotrevista@gmail.com |
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1822167253180743680 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.31977/grirfi.v21i2.2323 |