Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ketzer, Patrícia
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990
Resumo: Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility.
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spelling Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theoriesFundacionalismo: da tradição às teorias moderadasJustification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism.Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo.Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility.Historicamente a epistemologia tem definido conhecimento como universal e infalível, mas a tradição não deu conta de resolver de forma suficientemente satisfatória as questões colocadas pelos céticos, tais como o questionamento da existência do mundo externo à mente, o argumento da ilusão e do erro, entre outros. Diante disso, reformulações no conceito de conhecimento têm sido admitidas, dando origem a novas abordagens em Epistemologia. Entre as novas abordagens propostas estão as teorias falibilistas, que defendem o conhecimento como falível e nossas crenças anuláveis e revisáveis. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo explicitar a teoria da justificação fundacionalista, tanto na sua origem, com as propostas infalibilistas, quanto as posteriores reformulações. O fundacionalismo foi uma das primeiras alternativas ao problema da justificação de crenças, mas sua proposta de deter o regresso epistêmico com crenças básicas infalíveis deu origem a uma série de objeções céticas. Em decorrência disto, um enfraquecimento desta teoria foi formulado, a saber, as teorias falibilistas, que defendem que o conhecimento não é universal e irrevogável, mas que pode ser revisto e aperfeiçoado. Na primeira parte do trabalho, apresentaremos a questão da justificação epistêmica e o problema do regresso de razões. Em um segundo momento, explicitaremos o fundacionalismo tradicional, a maneira como este concebeu o regresso epistêmico, bem como às objeções a ele apresentadas. E por fim, apresentaremos as formulações falibilistas e como estas tentam dar conta dos problemas deixados pela tradição. Este trabalho pretende mostrar que o falibilismo corresponde a uma nova forma de compreender o conhecimento em epistemologia e, para tal, reformula conceitoscomo o de infalibilidade e universalidade.Universidade Federal do Ceará2011-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed Articleapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 5Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 5Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 51984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990/29709Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessKetzer, Patrícia2021-07-24T12:26:54Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/18990Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-07-24T12:26:54Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
Fundacionalismo: da tradição às teorias moderadas
title Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
spellingShingle Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
Ketzer, Patrícia
Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism.
Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo.
title_short Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
title_full Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
title_fullStr Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
title_full_unstemmed Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
title_sort Foundationalism: from tradition to moderate theories
author Ketzer, Patrícia
author_facet Ketzer, Patrícia
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ketzer, Patrícia
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism.
Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo.
topic Justification. Foundationalism. Infallibilism. Fallibilism.
Justificação. Fundacionalismo. Infalibilismo. Falibilismo.
description Historically epistemology has defined knowledge as universal and infallible. However, tradition has not accounted for solving in a sufficiently satisfactory way the issues posed by skeptics such as the question of existence of an external world outside the mind, the argument from illusion and from error, among others. Consequently, reformulations of the concept of knowledge have been proposed, developing new approaches to Epistemology. Fallibilist theories are found among the new approaches proposed, they defend that knowledge is fallible, and that our beliefs are nullified and in need of revision. This paper aims to describe the foundationalist theory of justification, both in its origin, including the proposed infallibility, as the subsequent reformulation. Foundationalism was one of the first alternatives to the problem of justification of beliefs, but his proposal to halt a epistemic regress to beliefs infallible led to a series of skeptical objections. Consequently, a weakening of this theory was formulated, namely fallibilist theories which argue that knowledge is not universal and irrevocable, but may be revised and improved. In the first part of this paper, presents the issue of epistemic justification and the problem of return of reasons. Posteriorly, explaining the traditional foundationalism, the way it conceived the epistemic regress as well as the objections to it presented. Finally, presents the formulations fallibilist and as they attempt to solve the problems left by tradition. This paper aims to show that fallibilism entails a way of understanding knowledge in epistemology and in so doing recasts concepts such as universality and infallibility.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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Peer-reviewed Article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990
url http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/18990/29709
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Federal do Ceará
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 5
Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 5
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 5
1984-4255
1984-4247
reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
instacron:UFC
instname_str Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
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reponame_str Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
collection Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
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