Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2014 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981 |
Resumo: | We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size. |
id |
UFRGS-2_3258ded7157b44270c17500ee508df90 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/106981 |
network_acronym_str |
UFRGS-2 |
network_name_str |
Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Vainstein, Mendeli HenningBrito, CarolinaArenzon, Jeferson Jacob2014-11-15T02:15:50Z20141539-3755http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981000940971We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size.application/pdfengPhysical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics. Vol. 90, no. 2 (Aug. 2014), 022132, 6 p.Teoria de redesTeoria dos jogosPercolaçãoPercolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clustersEstrangeiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSORIGINAL000940971.pdf000940971.pdfTexto completo (inglês)application/pdf650052http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/1/000940971.pdf2c6c84b0c4e86e0743fffd1ac3af29a3MD51TEXT000940971.pdf.txt000940971.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain32477http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/2/000940971.pdf.txtefed671840c8110be7659ab003db8ae1MD52THUMBNAIL000940971.pdf.jpg000940971.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2121http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/3/000940971.pdf.jpg711f36e1cf4789b13d7567993c6a8c52MD5310183/1069812024-03-28 06:25:30.559046oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/106981Repositório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestopendoar:2024-03-28T09:25:30Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
title |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
spellingShingle |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters Vainstein, Mendeli Henning Teoria de redes Teoria dos jogos Percolação |
title_short |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
title_full |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
title_fullStr |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
title_full_unstemmed |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
title_sort |
Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters |
author |
Vainstein, Mendeli Henning |
author_facet |
Vainstein, Mendeli Henning Brito, Carolina Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Brito, Carolina Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vainstein, Mendeli Henning Brito, Carolina Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Teoria de redes Teoria dos jogos Percolação |
topic |
Teoria de redes Teoria dos jogos Percolação |
description |
We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2014-11-15T02:15:50Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2014 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
Estrangeiro info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981 |
dc.identifier.issn.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
1539-3755 |
dc.identifier.nrb.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
000940971 |
identifier_str_mv |
1539-3755 000940971 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartof.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics. Vol. 90, no. 2 (Aug. 2014), 022132, 6 p. |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGS instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) instacron:UFRGS |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) |
instacron_str |
UFRGS |
institution |
UFRGS |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/1/000940971.pdf http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/2/000940971.pdf.txt http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/3/000940971.pdf.jpg |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
2c6c84b0c4e86e0743fffd1ac3af29a3 efed671840c8110be7659ab003db8ae1 711f36e1cf4789b13d7567993c6a8c52 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
_version_ |
1801224856057937920 |