Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vainstein, Mendeli Henning
Data de Publicação: 2014
Outros Autores: Brito, Carolina, Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFRGS
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981
Resumo: We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size.
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spelling Vainstein, Mendeli HenningBrito, CarolinaArenzon, Jeferson Jacob2014-11-15T02:15:50Z20141539-3755http://hdl.handle.net/10183/106981000940971We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size.application/pdfengPhysical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics. Vol. 90, no. 2 (Aug. 2014), 022132, 6 p.Teoria de redesTeoria dos jogosPercolaçãoPercolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clustersEstrangeiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSORIGINAL000940971.pdf000940971.pdfTexto completo (inglês)application/pdf650052http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/1/000940971.pdf2c6c84b0c4e86e0743fffd1ac3af29a3MD51TEXT000940971.pdf.txt000940971.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain32477http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/2/000940971.pdf.txtefed671840c8110be7659ab003db8ae1MD52THUMBNAIL000940971.pdf.jpg000940971.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2121http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/106981/3/000940971.pdf.jpg711f36e1cf4789b13d7567993c6a8c52MD5310183/1069812024-03-28 06:25:30.559046oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/106981Repositório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestopendoar:2024-03-28T09:25:30Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
title Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
spellingShingle Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
Vainstein, Mendeli Henning
Teoria de redes
Teoria dos jogos
Percolação
title_short Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
title_full Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
title_fullStr Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
title_full_unstemmed Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
title_sort Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents geometric and strategy clusters
author Vainstein, Mendeli Henning
author_facet Vainstein, Mendeli Henning
Brito, Carolina
Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob
author_role author
author2 Brito, Carolina
Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vainstein, Mendeli Henning
Brito, Carolina
Arenzon, Jeferson Jacob
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Teoria de redes
Teoria dos jogos
Percolação
topic Teoria de redes
Teoria dos jogos
Percolação
description We study the conditions for persistent cooperation in an off-lattice model of mobile agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with pure, unconditional strategies. Each agent has an exclusion radius rp , which accounts for the population viscosity, and an interaction radius rint, which defines the instantaneous contact network for the game dynamics. We show that, differently from the rp = 0 case, the model with finite-sized agents presents a coexistence phase with both cooperators and defectors, besides the two absorbing phases, in which either cooperators or defectors dominate.We provide, in addition, a geometric interpretation of the transitions between phases. In analogy with lattice models, the geometric percolation of the contact network (i.e., irrespective of the strategy) enhances cooperation. More importantly, we show that the percolation of defectors is an essential condition for their survival. Differently from compact clusters of cooperators, isolated groups of defectors will eventually become extinct if not percolating, independently of their size.
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dc.relation.ispartof.pt_BR.fl_str_mv Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics. Vol. 90, no. 2 (Aug. 2014), 022132, 6 p.
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