Unsafe reasoning : a survey
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFRGS |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10183/159426 |
Resumo: | Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative. |
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Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella2017-06-09T02:28:17Z20091807-3883http://hdl.handle.net/10183/159426000783162Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative.application/pdfengDoispontos : revista dos Departamentos de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná e da Universidade Federal de São Carlos. Curitiba, PR. Vol. 6, n. 2 (out. 2009), p. 185-201Inferência (Filosofia)Pressuposição (Lógica)Externalismo (Filosofia da mente)Externalismo (Epistemologia)LógicaInferencePresuppositionContent externalismLogical luckUnsafe reasoning : a surveyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFRGSinstname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)instacron:UFRGSORIGINAL000783162.pdf000783162.pdfTexto completo (inglês)application/pdf101866http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/159426/1/000783162.pdf18aefe9dae5191da9db1647a5d87db2bMD51TEXT000783162.pdf.txt000783162.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain39029http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/159426/2/000783162.pdf.txted8c75fef26cfdc0436654f8067b1640MD52THUMBNAIL000783162.pdf.jpg000783162.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1547http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/10183/159426/3/000783162.pdf.jpg2b6938a26f7ddc27221110b1a6979e07MD5310183/1594262021-07-09 04:35:07.235404oai:www.lume.ufrgs.br:10183/159426Repositório de PublicaçõesPUBhttps://lume.ufrgs.br/oai/requestopendoar:2021-07-09T07:35:07Repositório Institucional da UFRGS - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
title |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
spellingShingle |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella Inferência (Filosofia) Pressuposição (Lógica) Externalismo (Filosofia da mente) Externalismo (Epistemologia) Lógica Inference Presupposition Content externalism Logical luck |
title_short |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
title_full |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
title_fullStr |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
title_full_unstemmed |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
title_sort |
Unsafe reasoning : a survey |
author |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
author_facet |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Inferência (Filosofia) Pressuposição (Lógica) Externalismo (Filosofia da mente) Externalismo (Epistemologia) Lógica |
topic |
Inferência (Filosofia) Pressuposição (Lógica) Externalismo (Filosofia da mente) Externalismo (Epistemologia) Lógica Inference Presupposition Content externalism Logical luck |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Inference Presupposition Content externalism Logical luck |
description |
Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2009 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2017-06-09T02:28:17Z |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
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publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10183/159426 |
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1807-3883 |
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000783162 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10183/159426 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
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eng |
dc.relation.ispartof.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Doispontos : revista dos Departamentos de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná e da Universidade Federal de São Carlos. Curitiba, PR. Vol. 6, n. 2 (out. 2009), p. 185-201 |
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openAccess |
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