Dialética e o método da ética em Aristóteles

• Autor(a) principal: Zillig, Raphael
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UFRGS
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/180340
• topic: Aristóteles, 384-322 A.C; Ética; Filosofia

For the last decades, the thesis according to which dialectic provides the core methodological standard for Aristotle’s practical philosophy has had wide acceptance. This thesis has been associated to the much-discussed methodological passage of Nicomachean Ethics VII 1, 1145b2-7. As a matter of fact, the traditional reading of that passage finds in it a procedure that is based on the survey of aporiai that have been drawn from a set of endoxa or “reputable opinions”. As the procedure so understood is thoroughly focused on endoxa and in virtue of its diaporematic approach, it can be related to dialectic as it is discussed in the Topics. In this paper, I intend to address the limitations of the traditional interpretation and put forward an alternative reading for the methodological passage of Nicomachean Ethics VII 1. In the proposed reading, the passage does not have a tight connection with dialectic. From this it does not follow that dialectical procedures play no role in the method of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. However, in the proposed reading the passage of NE VII 1 no longer provides the basis for the thesis that such method is to be understood as being fundamentally dialectical in its nature.