La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Princípios (Natal. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714 |
Resumo: | On February 12, 1440 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) concludes in his birthplace of Kues drafting the first major systematic formulation of his thinking: De docta ignorantia. The main category of his metaphysics in this context, i.e. the maximum, is analyzed and interpreted by him on three considerations: the maximum in an absolute sense, as contracted and finally as absolute and contracted, at the same time. In the context of the First Book, which presents the singular methodology of the docta ignorantia, considers the maximum in itself in light of the paradoxical concept of coincidentia oppositorum in the absolute. In the final chapters of this first book tackles the critical of the theological discourse and thus, the problem of the ineffable name of maximum et minimum absolutum. Hence the purpose of this work is the further on cusan’s evaluation of language problem as it shows through treatment of the theological discourses and divine names that emerge from them, in light of the way of docta ignorantia. |
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La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusadocta ignorantiacoincidentia oppositorummaximum et minimum absolutumdiscurso teológiconomes inefáveis On February 12, 1440 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) concludes in his birthplace of Kues drafting the first major systematic formulation of his thinking: De docta ignorantia. The main category of his metaphysics in this context, i.e. the maximum, is analyzed and interpreted by him on three considerations: the maximum in an absolute sense, as contracted and finally as absolute and contracted, at the same time. In the context of the First Book, which presents the singular methodology of the docta ignorantia, considers the maximum in itself in light of the paradoxical concept of coincidentia oppositorum in the absolute. In the final chapters of this first book tackles the critical of the theological discourse and thus, the problem of the ineffable name of maximum et minimum absolutum. Hence the purpose of this work is the further on cusan’s evaluation of language problem as it shows through treatment of the theological discourses and divine names that emerge from them, in light of the way of docta ignorantia.EDUFRN2012-04-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 18 n. 30 (2011): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 27-521983-21090104-8694reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714/1179Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRios, José González2016-12-16T17:03:21Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/1714Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2016-12-16T17:03:21Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
title |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
spellingShingle |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa Rios, José González docta ignorantia coincidentia oppositorum maximum et minimum absolutum discurso teológico nomes inefáveis |
title_short |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
title_full |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
title_fullStr |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
title_full_unstemmed |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
title_sort |
La concepción intelectual de lo divino como coincidentia oppositorum a la luz de lo maximum et minimum absolutum en el pensamiento de Nicolás de Cusa |
author |
Rios, José González |
author_facet |
Rios, José González |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rios, José González |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
docta ignorantia coincidentia oppositorum maximum et minimum absolutum discurso teológico nomes inefáveis |
topic |
docta ignorantia coincidentia oppositorum maximum et minimum absolutum discurso teológico nomes inefáveis |
description |
On February 12, 1440 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) concludes in his birthplace of Kues drafting the first major systematic formulation of his thinking: De docta ignorantia. The main category of his metaphysics in this context, i.e. the maximum, is analyzed and interpreted by him on three considerations: the maximum in an absolute sense, as contracted and finally as absolute and contracted, at the same time. In the context of the First Book, which presents the singular methodology of the docta ignorantia, considers the maximum in itself in light of the paradoxical concept of coincidentia oppositorum in the absolute. In the final chapters of this first book tackles the critical of the theological discourse and thus, the problem of the ineffable name of maximum et minimum absolutum. Hence the purpose of this work is the further on cusan’s evaluation of language problem as it shows through treatment of the theological discourses and divine names that emerge from them, in light of the way of docta ignorantia. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-04-02 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1714/1179 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2014 Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN) |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 18 n. 30 (2011): Princípios: revista de filosofia; 27-52 1983-2109 0104-8694 reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) instacron:UFRN |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
instacron_str |
UFRN |
institution |
UFRN |
reponame_str |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
collection |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||principios@cchla.ufrn.br |
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1799769977882935296 |