English
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Princípios (Natal. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120 |
Resumo: | I answer in this paper to Stuart Brock’s (2010, 2016) main objection to artifactualism. According to Brock, artifactualists like Amie Thomasson (1999) can’t explain how and when fictional objects are created, thus taking artifactualism as a sort of theological creationism. Contrary to Brock, and adapting John Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to this case, I argue that fictional objects are created through a performative utterance that, in order to be felicitous, has to be (i) made by an adequate individual (an author), (ii) with the proper intentions (the act of fiction-making), (iii) in an appropriate context (associated with our pre-established practices of fiction) where the author (iv) names, gives at least a description or provides an image in order to institute the individual object through his or her intentional acts. |
id |
UFRN-5_9d54992440ff1ee708673e9c40bdd32b |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/23120 |
network_acronym_str |
UFRN-5 |
network_name_str |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
EnglishWhat does it take for an author to create a fictional object?Objetos FiccionaisObjetos AbstratosArtefatosAtos de FalaPerformativosI answer in this paper to Stuart Brock’s (2010, 2016) main objection to artifactualism. According to Brock, artifactualists like Amie Thomasson (1999) can’t explain how and when fictional objects are created, thus taking artifactualism as a sort of theological creationism. Contrary to Brock, and adapting John Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to this case, I argue that fictional objects are created through a performative utterance that, in order to be felicitous, has to be (i) made by an adequate individual (an author), (ii) with the proper intentions (the act of fiction-making), (iii) in an appropriate context (associated with our pre-established practices of fiction) where the author (iv) names, gives at least a description or provides an image in order to institute the individual object through his or her intentional acts.Neste artigo eu respondo à objeção principal de Stuart Brock (2010, 2016) ao artefactualismo. De acordo com Brock, artefactualistas como Amie Thomasson (1999) não conseguem explicar como e quando os objetos ficcionais são criados, sendo o artefactualismo, portanto, um tipo de criacionismo teológico. Contrariamente a Brock, e adaptando a teoria dos atos de fala de John Austin (1962) ao presente caso, eu argumento que objetos ficcionais são criados através de um proferimento performativo que, para ser feliz, deve (i) ser realizado pelo indivíduo adequado (um autor ou autora), (ii) com as intenções apropriadas (o ato de realização de ficção), no contexto adequado (associado às nossas práticas pré-estabelecidas de ficção) onde o autor ou autora (iv) nomeia, fornece ao menos uma descrição ou oferece uma imagem para instituir o objeto individual através dos seus atos intencionais.EDUFRN2021-05-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/2312010.21680/1983-2109.2021v28n56ID23120Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 28 n. 56 (2021): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 9-271983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2021v28n56reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120/14250Copyright (c) 2021 Italo Lins Lemosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLins Lemos, Italo2021-06-02T15:47:30Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/23120Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2021-06-02T15:47:30Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
English What does it take for an author to create a fictional object? |
title |
English |
spellingShingle |
English Lins Lemos, Italo Objetos Ficcionais Objetos Abstratos Artefatos Atos de Fala Performativos |
title_short |
English |
title_full |
English |
title_fullStr |
English |
title_full_unstemmed |
English |
title_sort |
English |
author |
Lins Lemos, Italo |
author_facet |
Lins Lemos, Italo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Lins Lemos, Italo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Objetos Ficcionais Objetos Abstratos Artefatos Atos de Fala Performativos |
topic |
Objetos Ficcionais Objetos Abstratos Artefatos Atos de Fala Performativos |
description |
I answer in this paper to Stuart Brock’s (2010, 2016) main objection to artifactualism. According to Brock, artifactualists like Amie Thomasson (1999) can’t explain how and when fictional objects are created, thus taking artifactualism as a sort of theological creationism. Contrary to Brock, and adapting John Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to this case, I argue that fictional objects are created through a performative utterance that, in order to be felicitous, has to be (i) made by an adequate individual (an author), (ii) with the proper intentions (the act of fiction-making), (iii) in an appropriate context (associated with our pre-established practices of fiction) where the author (iv) names, gives at least a description or provides an image in order to institute the individual object through his or her intentional acts. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-05-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Avaliado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120 10.21680/1983-2109.2021v28n56ID23120 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.21680/1983-2109.2021v28n56ID23120 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/23120/14250 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Italo Lins Lemos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Italo Lins Lemos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
EDUFRN |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 28 n. 56 (2021): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 9-27 1983-2109 0104-8694 10.21680/1983-2109.2021v28n56 reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) instacron:UFRN |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
instacron_str |
UFRN |
institution |
UFRN |
reponame_str |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
collection |
Princípios (Natal. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||principios@cchla.ufrn.br |
_version_ |
1799769979624620032 |