The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: R. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Princípios (Natal. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/18067
Resumo: We analyze in this article the mais philosophical characteristics of the moral skepticism of Mackie and the moral contextualism of MacIntyre. From the ontological point of view, we claim that Mackie and MacIntyre adopt different ontologies. Mackie takes a physicalist ontology or materialistic and MacIntyre a social and cultural ontology. For this reason, Mackie concludes that moral values are not objective, whereas MacIntyre concludes, on the contrary, that moral values are objetive. From the linguistic point of view, Mackie’s theory of ‘error’ postulates that the use of Western moral language is based on a (false) belief in the objectivity of moral values, whereas MacIntyre’s theory of contemporary moral disagreement proposes, unlike, that the use of moral language in postmodern society is based os a (false) belief in the subjectivity of moral values.
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spelling The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyreOs mundos morais possíveis de Mackie e MacIntyreEthicsSkepticismContextualismMoral OntologyLinguisticsObjectivityÉtica;CeticismoContextualismoOntologia MoralLinguísticaObjetividadeWe analyze in this article the mais philosophical characteristics of the moral skepticism of Mackie and the moral contextualism of MacIntyre. From the ontological point of view, we claim that Mackie and MacIntyre adopt different ontologies. Mackie takes a physicalist ontology or materialistic and MacIntyre a social and cultural ontology. For this reason, Mackie concludes that moral values are not objective, whereas MacIntyre concludes, on the contrary, that moral values are objetive. From the linguistic point of view, Mackie’s theory of ‘error’ postulates that the use of Western moral language is based on a (false) belief in the objectivity of moral values, whereas MacIntyre’s theory of contemporary moral disagreement proposes, unlike, that the use of moral language in postmodern society is based os a (false) belief in the subjectivity of moral values.Analisamos nesse artigo as principais características filosóficas do ceticismo moral de Mackie e do contextualismo moral de MacIntyre. Do ponto-de-vista ontológico. Reivindicamos que Mackie e MacIntyre adotam ontologias diferentes. Mackie adota uma ontologia fisicalista ou materialista e MacIntyre uma ontologia social e cultural. Por essa razão, Mackie conclui que valores morais não são objetivos, enquanto MacIntyre conclui, ao contrário, que valores morais são objetivos. Do ponto-de-vista linguístico. Reivindicamos que a teoria do ‘erro’ de Mackie postula que o uso da linguagem moral ocidental é baseado numa crença (falsa) na objetividade dos valores morais, e a teoria do desacordo moral contemporâneo de MacIntyre propõe, ao contrário, que o uso da linguagem moral na sociedade pós-moderna é baseado numa crença (falsa) na subjetividade dos valores morais.EDUFRN2019-10-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado pelos paresapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/1806710.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51ID18067Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 26 n. 51 (2019): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 147-1831983-21090104-869410.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)instacron:UFRNporhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/18067/12111Copyright (c) 2019 Hippolyto R. da S. Ribeiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessR. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto2019-10-11T19:00:45Zoai:periodicos.ufrn.br:article/18067Revistahttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principiosPUBhttps://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/oai||principios@cchla.ufrn.br1983-21090104-8694opendoar:2019-10-11T19:00:45Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
Os mundos morais possíveis de Mackie e MacIntyre
title The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
spellingShingle The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
R. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto
Ethics
Skepticism
Contextualism
Moral Ontology
Linguistics
Objectivity
Ética;
Ceticismo
Contextualismo
Ontologia Moral
Linguística
Objetividade
title_short The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
title_full The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
title_fullStr The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
title_full_unstemmed The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
title_sort The possible moral worlds of Mackie and MacIntyre
author R. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto
author_facet R. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv R. da S. Ribeiro, Hippolyto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Ethics
Skepticism
Contextualism
Moral Ontology
Linguistics
Objectivity
Ética;
Ceticismo
Contextualismo
Ontologia Moral
Linguística
Objetividade
topic Ethics
Skepticism
Contextualism
Moral Ontology
Linguistics
Objectivity
Ética;
Ceticismo
Contextualismo
Ontologia Moral
Linguística
Objetividade
description We analyze in this article the mais philosophical characteristics of the moral skepticism of Mackie and the moral contextualism of MacIntyre. From the ontological point of view, we claim that Mackie and MacIntyre adopt different ontologies. Mackie takes a physicalist ontology or materialistic and MacIntyre a social and cultural ontology. For this reason, Mackie concludes that moral values are not objective, whereas MacIntyre concludes, on the contrary, that moral values are objetive. From the linguistic point of view, Mackie’s theory of ‘error’ postulates that the use of Western moral language is based on a (false) belief in the objectivity of moral values, whereas MacIntyre’s theory of contemporary moral disagreement proposes, unlike, that the use of moral language in postmodern society is based os a (false) belief in the subjectivity of moral values.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-10-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Avaliado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/18067
10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51ID18067
url https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/18067
identifier_str_mv 10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51ID18067
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufrn.br/principios/article/view/18067/12111
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Hippolyto R. da S. Ribeiro
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2019 Hippolyto R. da S. Ribeiro
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EDUFRN
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); v. 26 n. 51 (2019): Princípios: Revista de Filosofia (UFRN); 147-183
1983-2109
0104-8694
10.21680/1983-2109.2019v26n51
reponame:Princípios (Natal. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron:UFRN
instname_str Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
instacron_str UFRN
institution UFRN
reponame_str Princípios (Natal. Online)
collection Princípios (Natal. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Princípios (Natal. Online) - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||principios@cchla.ufrn.br
_version_ 1799769979142275072

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