O que significa seguir uma regra? Significado, normatividade e contexto

• Autor(a) principal: Santos, Vinicius de Faria dos
• Data de Publicação: 2016
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRRJ
• Texto Completo: https://tede.ufrrj.br/jspui/handle/jspui/5190
• topic: Ceticismo Sem?ntico; Naturalismo Sem?ntico; Contextualismo Sem?ntico; Semantic Scepticism; Semantic Naturalism; Semantic Contextualism; Filosofia

This dissertation discusses the problem of following a rule formulated here in terms of the problem of justification of linguistic meaning. I will focus on the problem of Rules Skepticism, which is reading fruit too controversial of the Philosophical Investigations by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), which thus plays the "paradox of the rules" contained in paragraphs 201 and 202 of the IF and attributes to Wittgenstein the discovery of a new and radical kind of skepticism ? the semantic ? for which there is not a fact or a reason to determine the meaning we give to our words and justify the use of a meaning to the detriment otherwise. The Kripke?s semantic skeptic is built from the problem of denotation of the terms of mathematical statements (in this case '68 + 57 = 125') and challenges us to answer your insidious doubt. Therefore, formulates a triple appropriateness criteria in the response to his challenge, namely (1) the ontological or indication of existence, (2) the normative and (3) the extensional identification in time. I propose in the first chapter to introduce the distinctions between the relevant concepts to the elucidation of what is called into question in the problem analysis, focusing, then, in the formulation of the skeptical paradox and its appropriateness criteria in the response. Subsequently, in subsequent chapters step to examine the two most famous theoretical alternatives to the challenge. In Chapter 2 I will analyze the possibility of semantic facts consist of no semantic facts, i.e., facts concerning the verbal behavior of speakers. In Third Chapter, I will check out the possibility that they are primitive, contextual facts. At the end, the scope of the text is to assess whether some version of one of the semantic theories of groups presented -firstly those incorporating dispositional analysis elements, and secondly, the context - can consistently to object to the skeptical paradox, or refuting it or elucidating some weakness or inconsistency. I will sustain the urgency of a review of the assumptions made by the skeptical from the critical Wittgensteinian the vaunted 'Augustinian picture of language' (Augustinian Urbild) and the sense of philosophical quietism due to its grammatical method.