Theoretical-conceptual proposal for analyzing the reliability and credibility of scientific (mis)information in the media: implications for Science Teaching

• Autor(a) principal: Pereira, Aldo Aoyagui Gomes
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Santos, Camilia Aoyagui dos
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Caderno Brasileiro de Ensino de Física (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/fisica/article/view/83882
• topic: Misinformation; Post-Truth; Media; Science Teaching; Science Media Literacy; Desinformação; Pós-verdade; Mídia; Ensino de Ciências; Alfabetização Científica Midiática

It has become a common strategy in the current scenario, especially after the rise of the Internet and social media, the enacting and production of alternative facts, by simulating the credentials of a genuinely scientific discourse. Transmitting confidence and using a naïve interpretation of the nature of science, influencers and false experts elaborate a persuasive narrative with several goals. Among them, promoting blind skepticism by questioning recommendations from scientific institutions and experts, and claiming for more evidence and irrefutable proof for scientific theories already consolidated into the scientific community. Based on researches that discuss the relevance of epistemic dependence and epistemic trust, we highlight the importance of taking the discussion of institutional and social aspects of science into science classes. For that, we describe problem-solving situations with a scientific component in which the concepts of expertise, credentials, credibility, conflict of interest and scientific consensus can function as a social epistemic structure to analyze the reliability and credibility of scientific (mis)information communicated by the media. Given the current post-truth scenario, our main reflection is that in cases that present a complex epistemological structure of analysis, such as the claims with a scientific component broadcasted by the media, we are all epistemically dependent on each other. In this context, we consider that the fundamental concern is the analysis not of scientific evidence itself, but of evidence and related criteria about who we consider to be an expert to be a spokesperson for science.