Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39

• Autor(a) principal: Manero, Juan Ruiz
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Sequência (Florianópolis. Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39

Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen’s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author’s view, Bobbio’s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm.