Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
Resumo: | Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen’s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author’s view, Bobbio’s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm. |
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Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente ÚltimaThroughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen’s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author’s view, Bobbio’s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm. A lo largo de su extensísima obra, Bobbio se ha ocupado en repetidas ocasiones de las dos principales versiones del concepto de norma jurídicamente última: el concepto de norma básica o fundamental de Kelsen y el concepto de regla de reconocimiento de Hart. Tanto en relación con el concepto de norma básica como en relación con el concepto de regla de reconocimiento Bobbio ha defendido –en unos textos– que se trataba de conceptos imprescindibles y también –en textos posteriores– que se trataba de conceptos no sólo innecesarios sino inconvenientes, de conceptos de cuya eliminación se beneficiaría la teoría del derecho resultante. A juicio del autor, la teoría del derecho necesita integrar un concepto de norma jurídicamente última. Y, también a juicio del autor, las propuestas bobbianas de abandonar las dos principales versiones de este concepto van acompañadas y resultan inseparables de interpretaciones de una y otra que resultan claramente desencaminadas en el caso del concepto de regla de reconocimiento y por diversas razones no aceptables en el caso del concepto de norma básica.Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina2012-07-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p3910.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39Seqüência - Legal and Political Studies; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-56Revista Seqüência: Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-56Seqüência Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-562177-70550101-9562reponame:Sequência (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39/22464Manero, Juan Ruizinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-11-21T14:16:09Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/25494Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequenciaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/oai||sequencia@funjab.ufsc.br2177-70550101-9562opendoar:2022-11-21T11:34:55.584251Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)true |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última |
title |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
spellingShingle |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 Manero, Juan Ruiz |
title_short |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
title_full |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
title_fullStr |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
title_full_unstemmed |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
title_sort |
Bobbio and the Concepts of Legally Ultimate Norm doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
author |
Manero, Juan Ruiz |
author_facet |
Manero, Juan Ruiz |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Manero, Juan Ruiz |
description |
Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen’s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author’s view, Bobbio’s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm. |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012-07-11 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/2177-7055.2012v33n64p39/22464 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Seqüência - Legal and Political Studies; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-56 Revista Seqüência: Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-56 Seqüência Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 33 n. 64 (2012); 39-56 2177-7055 0101-9562 reponame:Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||sequencia@funjab.ufsc.br |
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