Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2006 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/15098 |
Resumo: | This article presents preliminary considerations on liberty rights, arguing initially that the concept of freedom in the legal sense is distinct from the concept of freedom in the actual sense. The central idea is that freedom in the legal sense consists of a normative authorization to act, while freedom in the actual sense is characterized as an effective capacity to act. The distinction is considered important to understand that not always a law based freedom coincides with a de facto freedom. Therefore, the article intends to distinguish the situations where the judicial power is entitled to enforce the respect for a freedom assured by law from those situations where the intervention of the legislative power only may correct the lack of correspondence between rights and reality. |
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Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedomsNoções preliminares de uma teoria jurídica das liberdadesThis article presents preliminary considerations on liberty rights, arguing initially that the concept of freedom in the legal sense is distinct from the concept of freedom in the actual sense. The central idea is that freedom in the legal sense consists of a normative authorization to act, while freedom in the actual sense is characterized as an effective capacity to act. The distinction is considered important to understand that not always a law based freedom coincides with a de facto freedom. Therefore, the article intends to distinguish the situations where the judicial power is entitled to enforce the respect for a freedom assured by law from those situations where the intervention of the legislative power only may correct the lack of correspondence between rights and reality.Este artigo apresenta considerações preliminares sobre os direitos de liberdade, argumentando inicialmente que o conceito de liberdade em sentido jurídico é distinto do conceito de liberdade em sentido fático. A idéia central é ade que a liberdade em sentido jurídico consiste numa autorização normativa de agir, enquanto a liberdade em sentido fático caracteriza-se como uma capacidade efetiva de agir. A distinção é considerada importante para compreender que nem sempre uma liberdade de direito coincide com uma liberdade de fato. Por isso, o artigo pretende distinguir as situações em que o poder judicial é competente para impor coativamente o respeito a uma liberdade juridicamente assegurada daquelas situações em que só a intervenção do poder legislativo pode corrigir a falta de correspondência entre os direitos e a realidade.Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina2006-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/1509810.5007/%xSeqüência - Legal and Political Studies; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-172Revista Seqüência: Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-172Seqüência Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-1722177-70550101-9562reponame:Sequência (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/15098/13753Martins Neto, João dos Passosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-11-21T14:15:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/15098Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequenciaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/oai||sequencia@funjab.ufsc.br2177-70550101-9562opendoar:2022-11-21T11:34:23.392832Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)true |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms Noções preliminares de uma teoria jurídica das liberdades |
title |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
spellingShingle |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms Martins Neto, João dos Passos |
title_short |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
title_full |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
title_fullStr |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
title_sort |
Preliminary slight knowledge of a legal theory of the freedoms |
author |
Martins Neto, João dos Passos |
author_facet |
Martins Neto, João dos Passos |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Martins Neto, João dos Passos |
description |
This article presents preliminary considerations on liberty rights, arguing initially that the concept of freedom in the legal sense is distinct from the concept of freedom in the actual sense. The central idea is that freedom in the legal sense consists of a normative authorization to act, while freedom in the actual sense is characterized as an effective capacity to act. The distinction is considered important to understand that not always a law based freedom coincides with a de facto freedom. Therefore, the article intends to distinguish the situations where the judicial power is entitled to enforce the respect for a freedom assured by law from those situations where the intervention of the legislative power only may correct the lack of correspondence between rights and reality. |
publishDate |
2006 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2006-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/15098 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/15098 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/sequencia/article/view/15098/13753 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Seqüência - Legal and Political Studies; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-172 Revista Seqüência: Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-172 Seqüência Estudos Jurídicos e Políticos; V. 27 n. 53 (2006); 163-172 2177-7055 0101-9562 reponame:Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Sequência (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||sequencia@funjab.ufsc.br |
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1789434795868028928 |