Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction”
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439 |
Resumo: | In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. |
id |
UFSC-5_1af2c4d150e56155c39cdb614ff27de3 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/58149 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction”Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates.Em Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman alega que o problema de justificar a indução não é algo acima do problema de descrever a indução válida. Tal alegação, além de sugerir o seu comprometimento com o colapso da distinção entre contexto de descoberta e contexto de justificação, parece abrir a possibilidade de que o seu próprio novo enigma da indução pudesse ser resolvido empiricamente. A descoberta de preferências psicológicas para a projeção de certas classes de objetos poderia servir de critério para quais predicados são afinal projetáveis. Neste artigo, defendo que a alegação de Goodman deve ser compreendida no interior do seu programa de definições construtivas, o qual, por sua vez, é metodologicamente orientado pelo equilíbrio reflexivo. A descrição da prática indutiva está comprometida com a articulação da extensão da classe selecionada pelo predicado “indução válida”, não com a descoberta dos possíveis mecanismos psicológicos subjacentes a esses usos. O ajuste mútuo entre considerações teóricas e a prática indutiva envolvida na proposta de uma definição de “indução válida” deve preservar a sua extensão tanto quanto possível, não há como se livrar do entrincheiramento. Achados empíricos acerca do mecanismo psicológico subjacente às projeções podem auxiliar o referido ajuste mútuo, mas não substituem o papel do entrincheiramento de predicados.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2018-12-28info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p43910.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 3 (2018); 439-460Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 3 (2018); 439-460Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 3 (2018); 439-4601808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalhoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCarvalho, Eros Moreira de2019-03-27T15:43:58Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/58149Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-03-27T15:43:58Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida” |
title |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
spellingShingle |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
title_short |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
title_full |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
title_fullStr |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
title_full_unstemmed |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
title_sort |
Goodman and the Project of a Constructional Definition of “Valid Induction” |
author |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_facet |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Carvalho, Eros Moreira de |
description |
In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim seems to open up the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-12-28 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439 10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n3p439/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Eros Moreira de Carvalho |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 3 (2018); 439-460 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 3 (2018); 439-460 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 3 (2018); 439-460 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435113763766272 |