About not denying a grain of salt
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86150 |
Resumo: | The aim of this paper is to resume and requalify the distinction between concepts and objects, as proposed by Frege, in the famous On Concept and Object (1892), reinforcing its importance for understanding the distinction between saying and showing, proposed by Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. The text also establish the influence of the aforementioned distinction on the treatment by the first Wittgenstein of paradoxes by impredicativeness. We then resume the analysis of Charles Travis, in: Where Words Fail (2020) on the subject, taking into account the point of view of the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein. For Travis, the obstacle involved in the difference between concepts and objects would be nothing more than a philosophical confusion, and should be dissolved. The arguments proposed by Travis are also briefly reviewed here, but our focus is mainly on concluding that the importance of the distinction must be traced within the limits of what can be described or defined additionally, and is configured as the end of explanations on the basis of what constitutes the semantic determination. In this sense, the importance of this distinction would even go beyond the scope of influence on the first Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and would appear to concern the approach of linguistic generality itself. |
id |
UFSC-5_26e85fce1aa5c99958d96cebefcfc339 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/86150 |
network_acronym_str |
UFSC-5 |
network_name_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
About not denying a grain of saltSobre não se negar um grão de salconceptsobjectsimpredicativenessWittgensteinFregeconceitosobjetosimpredicatividadeWittgensteinFregeThe aim of this paper is to resume and requalify the distinction between concepts and objects, as proposed by Frege, in the famous On Concept and Object (1892), reinforcing its importance for understanding the distinction between saying and showing, proposed by Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. The text also establish the influence of the aforementioned distinction on the treatment by the first Wittgenstein of paradoxes by impredicativeness. We then resume the analysis of Charles Travis, in: Where Words Fail (2020) on the subject, taking into account the point of view of the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein. For Travis, the obstacle involved in the difference between concepts and objects would be nothing more than a philosophical confusion, and should be dissolved. The arguments proposed by Travis are also briefly reviewed here, but our focus is mainly on concluding that the importance of the distinction must be traced within the limits of what can be described or defined additionally, and is configured as the end of explanations on the basis of what constitutes the semantic determination. In this sense, the importance of this distinction would even go beyond the scope of influence on the first Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and would appear to concern the approach of linguistic generality itself.O objetivo deste artigo é retomar e requalificar a distinção entre conceitos e objetos, tal como proposta por Frege, no célebre Sobre o Conceito e o Objeto (1892), reforçando sua importância para a compreensão da distinção entre dizer e mostrar, proposta pelo Wittgenstein do Tractatus. O texto também estabelece a influência da mencionada distinção para o tratamento pelo primeiro Wittgenstein dos paradoxos por impredicatividade. Retomamos então as análises de Charles Travis sobre o assunto, em: Where Words Fail (2020), levando-se em conta o ponto de vista da filosofia do segundo Wittgenstein. Para Travis, o obstáculo envolvido na distinção entre conceitos e objetos não passaria de uma confusão filosófica, devendo ser ela mesma dissolvida. Os argumentos propostos por Travis são também aqui brevemente passados em revista, mas nosso foco consiste principalmente em concluir que a importância da distinção deve ser rastreada nos limites do que pode ser descrito ou definido adicionalmente, e se configura como fim das explicações na base do que constitui a determinação semântica. Neste sentido, a importância dessa distinção ultrapassaria mesmo o âmbito da influência na filosofia do primeiro Wittgenstein, e apareceria como dizendo respeito à abordagem da generalidade linguística nela mesma.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-05-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8615010.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86150Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-63Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-63Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-631808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86150/53290Copyright (c) 2023 Camila Jourdanhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJourdan, Camila2023-10-22T20:37:35Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/86150Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-10-22T20:37:35Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
About not denying a grain of salt Sobre não se negar um grão de sal |
title |
About not denying a grain of salt |
spellingShingle |
About not denying a grain of salt Jourdan, Camila concepts objects impredicativeness Wittgenstein Frege conceitos objetos impredicatividade Wittgenstein Frege |
title_short |
About not denying a grain of salt |
title_full |
About not denying a grain of salt |
title_fullStr |
About not denying a grain of salt |
title_full_unstemmed |
About not denying a grain of salt |
title_sort |
About not denying a grain of salt |
author |
Jourdan, Camila |
author_facet |
Jourdan, Camila |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Jourdan, Camila |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
concepts objects impredicativeness Wittgenstein Frege conceitos objetos impredicatividade Wittgenstein Frege |
topic |
concepts objects impredicativeness Wittgenstein Frege conceitos objetos impredicatividade Wittgenstein Frege |
description |
The aim of this paper is to resume and requalify the distinction between concepts and objects, as proposed by Frege, in the famous On Concept and Object (1892), reinforcing its importance for understanding the distinction between saying and showing, proposed by Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. The text also establish the influence of the aforementioned distinction on the treatment by the first Wittgenstein of paradoxes by impredicativeness. We then resume the analysis of Charles Travis, in: Where Words Fail (2020) on the subject, taking into account the point of view of the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein. For Travis, the obstacle involved in the difference between concepts and objects would be nothing more than a philosophical confusion, and should be dissolved. The arguments proposed by Travis are also briefly reviewed here, but our focus is mainly on concluding that the importance of the distinction must be traced within the limits of what can be described or defined additionally, and is configured as the end of explanations on the basis of what constitutes the semantic determination. In this sense, the importance of this distinction would even go beyond the scope of influence on the first Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and would appear to concern the approach of linguistic generality itself. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-05-26 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86150 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86150 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86150 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e86150 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/86150/53290 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Camila Jourdan http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Camila Jourdan http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-63 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-63 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 1 (2023): Special Issue: The Logical Alien + Varia; 45-63 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1799875201215758336 |