Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Castellano, Federico
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277
Resumo: Philosophers have always tried to explain what concepts are. Currently, most neo- Fregean philosophers identify concepts with abilities peculiar to cognitive agents. Philosophers who defend a psychological view, in contrast, identify concepts with representations located in the mind. In this paper, I argue that concepts should be understood neither in terms of mental representations nor in terms of abilities. Concepts, I argue, are rules for sorting an inferring. To support this, I follow Ginsborg’s Kantian conception of concepts. Nevertheless, unlike Ginsborg, I provide an explanation of the cognitive relationship between concepts and thinkers that presupposes no linguistic awareness of any normative concept. In doing so, a dispositional approach to the normativity of concepts is proposed.
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spelling Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but RulesPhilosophers have always tried to explain what concepts are. Currently, most neo- Fregean philosophers identify concepts with abilities peculiar to cognitive agents. Philosophers who defend a psychological view, in contrast, identify concepts with representations located in the mind. In this paper, I argue that concepts should be understood neither in terms of mental representations nor in terms of abilities. Concepts, I argue, are rules for sorting an inferring. To support this, I follow Ginsborg’s Kantian conception of concepts. Nevertheless, unlike Ginsborg, I provide an explanation of the cognitive relationship between concepts and thinkers that presupposes no linguistic awareness of any normative concept. In doing so, a dispositional approach to the normativity of concepts is proposed.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2018-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p27710.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 2 (2018); 277-300Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (2018); 277-300Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 2 (2018); 277-3001808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Federico Castellanoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCastellano, Federico2019-02-07T08:55:18Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/54430Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-02-07T08:55:18Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
title Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
spellingShingle Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
Castellano, Federico
title_short Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
title_full Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
title_fullStr Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
title_full_unstemmed Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
title_sort Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
author Castellano, Federico
author_facet Castellano, Federico
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Castellano, Federico
description Philosophers have always tried to explain what concepts are. Currently, most neo- Fregean philosophers identify concepts with abilities peculiar to cognitive agents. Philosophers who defend a psychological view, in contrast, identify concepts with representations located in the mind. In this paper, I argue that concepts should be understood neither in terms of mental representations nor in terms of abilities. Concepts, I argue, are rules for sorting an inferring. To support this, I follow Ginsborg’s Kantian conception of concepts. Nevertheless, unlike Ginsborg, I provide an explanation of the cognitive relationship between concepts and thinkers that presupposes no linguistic awareness of any normative concept. In doing so, a dispositional approach to the normativity of concepts is proposed.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277
10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2018v22n2p277/pdf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Castellano
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Castellano
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 No. 2 (2018); 277-300
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (2018); 277-300
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 22 n. 2 (2018); 277-300
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
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instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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