Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Sankey, Howard
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
Resumo: This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.
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spelling Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to GrzankowskiNeither a truism nor a triviality: reply to GrzankowskiThis is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2019-08-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p36110.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2019); 361-365Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 361-365Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 361-3651808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankeyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSankey, Howard2019-12-16T17:16:29Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/65390Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-12-16T17:16:29Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
Neither a truism nor a triviality: reply to Grzankowski
title Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
spellingShingle Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
Sankey, Howard
title_short Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
title_full Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
title_fullStr Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
title_full_unstemmed Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
title_sort Neither a Truism nor a Triviality: Reply to Grzankowski
author Sankey, Howard
author_facet Sankey, Howard
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Sankey, Howard
description This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-08-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361/pdf
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankey
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Howard Sankey
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2019); 361-365
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 361-365
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 361-365
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
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reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
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