An Implicit Definition of Existence
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93 |
Resumo: | This work explores an implicit definition of ‘existence’. It has been traditionally contended that ‘being’ and ‘existence’ cannot be defined because there is no proximate genus for ‘being’. But a predicate of existence could—in principle—be defined as a theoretical term by its role in a ‘total theory’ of the world in which all our empirical knowledge, our formal knowledge, and our best metaphysical theory is included. It is contended that there is no reason against the intelligibility of a first-order predicate of existence, and that, even further, this predicate has priority over the existential quantifier, because the truthmakers for first-order attributions of existence—whatever they are—have ontological priority to the truthmakers for second-order attributions made by quantifications—whatever they are. Finally, several objections against the implicit definition are considered. |
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An Implicit Definition of ExistenceUna Definición Implícita de la ExistenciaUna Definición Implícita de La ExistenciaThis work explores an implicit definition of ‘existence’. It has been traditionally contended that ‘being’ and ‘existence’ cannot be defined because there is no proximate genus for ‘being’. But a predicate of existence could—in principle—be defined as a theoretical term by its role in a ‘total theory’ of the world in which all our empirical knowledge, our formal knowledge, and our best metaphysical theory is included. It is contended that there is no reason against the intelligibility of a first-order predicate of existence, and that, even further, this predicate has priority over the existential quantifier, because the truthmakers for first-order attributions of existence—whatever they are—have ontological priority to the truthmakers for second-order attributions made by quantifications—whatever they are. Finally, several objections against the implicit definition are considered.nSabeEste trabajo explora una definición implícita de la ‘existencia’. Se ha argumentado tradicionalmente que ‘ente’ y ‘existencia’ no pueden ser definidos porque no hay un género próximo para ‘ente’. Pero un predicado de existencia podría –en principio– ser definido como un término teórico por su rol en una ‘teoría total’ del mundo que incluya todo nuestro conocimiento empírico, nuestro conocimiento formal y nuestra mejor teoría metafísica. Se sostiene que no hay razón para rechazar la inteligibilidad de un predicado de existencia de primer nivel y que, incluso más, este predicado tiene prioridad respecto de la cuantificación existencial, porque los verificadores (truthmakers) de las atribuciones de existencia de primer nivel –cualquiera sean éstos– tienen prioridad ontológica respecto de los verificadores de las atribuciones de segundo nivel efectuadas por las cuantificaciones –cualquiera sean éstos. Finalmente, se consideran varias objeciones contra la definición implícita.This work explores an implicit definition of ‘existence’. It has been traditionally contended that ‘being’ and ‘existence’ cannot be defined because there is no proximate genus for ‘being’. But a predicate of existence could—in principle—be defined as a theoretical term by its role in a ‘total theory’ of the world in which all our empirical knowledge, our formal knowledge, and our best metaphysical theory is included. It is contended that there is no reason against the intelligibility of a first-order predicate of existence, and that, even further, this predicate has priority over the existential quantifier, because the truthmakers for first-order attributions of existence—whatever they are—have ontological priority to the truthmakers for second-order attributions made by quantifications—whatever they are. FinalFederal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2015-04-30info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p9310.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015); 93-119Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 Núm. 1 (2015); 93-119Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 19 n. 1 (2015); 93-1191808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93/30579Copyright (c) 2021 José Tomás Alvaradoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlvarado, José Tomás2019-09-13T10:32:16Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/36827Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T10:32:16Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
An Implicit Definition of Existence Una Definición Implícita de la Existencia Una Definición Implícita de La Existencia |
title |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
spellingShingle |
An Implicit Definition of Existence Alvarado, José Tomás |
title_short |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
title_full |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
title_fullStr |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
title_sort |
An Implicit Definition of Existence |
author |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
author_facet |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Alvarado, José Tomás |
description |
This work explores an implicit definition of ‘existence’. It has been traditionally contended that ‘being’ and ‘existence’ cannot be defined because there is no proximate genus for ‘being’. But a predicate of existence could—in principle—be defined as a theoretical term by its role in a ‘total theory’ of the world in which all our empirical knowledge, our formal knowledge, and our best metaphysical theory is included. It is contended that there is no reason against the intelligibility of a first-order predicate of existence, and that, even further, this predicate has priority over the existential quantifier, because the truthmakers for first-order attributions of existence—whatever they are—have ontological priority to the truthmakers for second-order attributions made by quantifications—whatever they are. Finally, several objections against the implicit definition are considered. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-04-30 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93 10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2015v19n1p93/30579 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 José Tomás Alvarado info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 José Tomás Alvarado |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015); 93-119 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 19 Núm. 1 (2015); 93-119 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 19 n. 1 (2015); 93-119 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435112554758144 |