Logic and Intensionality

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Imaguire, Guido
Data de Publicação: 2010
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111
Resumo: There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.
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spelling Logic and IntensionalityLogic and IntensionalityThere are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.As expressões “extensão” e “intensão” são usadas de diferentes modos. Eu especifico na primeira parte deste artigo dois sentidos básicos da distinção e procuro mostrar que o antigo sentido metafísico, em termos de instância vs. universal, é mais fundamental que o sentido contemporâneo em termos de substitutividade. Na segunda parte eu argument que toda lógica, de modo geral, é essencialmente intensional, não apenas porque lógica é uma atividade guiada por regras, mas porque até a definição extensional de um sistema lógico pressupõe uma noção intensional de conseqüência lógica.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2010-01-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p11110.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010); 111-24Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 1 (2010); 111-24Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 1 (2010); 111-241808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111/17983Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguireinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessImaguire, Guido2020-01-22T08:48:54Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/19666Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-01-22T08:48:54Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Logic and Intensionality
Logic and Intensionality
title Logic and Intensionality
spellingShingle Logic and Intensionality
Imaguire, Guido
title_short Logic and Intensionality
title_full Logic and Intensionality
title_fullStr Logic and Intensionality
title_full_unstemmed Logic and Intensionality
title_sort Logic and Intensionality
author Imaguire, Guido
author_facet Imaguire, Guido
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Imaguire, Guido
description There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-01-05
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111
10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111/17983
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguire
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguire
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010); 111-24
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 1 (2010); 111-24
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 1 (2010); 111-24
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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