Logic and Intensionality
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2010 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 |
Resumo: | There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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Logic and IntensionalityLogic and IntensionalityThere are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.As expressões “extensão” e “intensão” são usadas de diferentes modos. Eu especifico na primeira parte deste artigo dois sentidos básicos da distinção e procuro mostrar que o antigo sentido metafísico, em termos de instância vs. universal, é mais fundamental que o sentido contemporâneo em termos de substitutividade. Na segunda parte eu argument que toda lógica, de modo geral, é essencialmente intensional, não apenas porque lógica é uma atividade guiada por regras, mas porque até a definição extensional de um sistema lógico pressupõe uma noção intensional de conseqüência lógica.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2010-01-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p11110.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010); 111-24Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 1 (2010); 111-24Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 1 (2010); 111-241808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111/17983Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguireinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessImaguire, Guido2020-01-22T08:48:54Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/19666Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2020-01-22T08:48:54Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Logic and Intensionality Logic and Intensionality |
title |
Logic and Intensionality |
spellingShingle |
Logic and Intensionality Imaguire, Guido |
title_short |
Logic and Intensionality |
title_full |
Logic and Intensionality |
title_fullStr |
Logic and Intensionality |
title_full_unstemmed |
Logic and Intensionality |
title_sort |
Logic and Intensionality |
author |
Imaguire, Guido |
author_facet |
Imaguire, Guido |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Imaguire, Guido |
description |
There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence. |
publishDate |
2010 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2010-01-05 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111/17983 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguire info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Guido Imaguire |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010); 111-24 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 14 Núm. 1 (2010); 111-24 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 14 n. 1 (2010); 111-24 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435111334215680 |