La naturalidad del escepticismo

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Coll Mármol, Jesus Antonio
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
Resumo: In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.
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spelling La naturalidad del escepticismoLa naturalidad del escepticismoLa naturalidad del escepticismoIn this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.Neste artigo, examino a estratégia anticética de M. Williams de considerar o ceticismo como uma posição não natural, filosoficamente carregada, o que para ele implica que o ceticismo não tem nada a ver com nossas práticas epistêmicas. Admito que essa estratégia é realmente prometedora, especialmente quando aplicada ao ceticismo cartesiano. Contudo, quando ela enfrenta um ancestral mais velho do ceticismo cartesiano, o ceticismo pirrônico, a situação muda. Concentro-me na proposta neopirrônica de Fogelin, e em como a estratégia de Williams se comportaria frente a ela. Defenderei que o ceticismo pirrônico é uma espécie completamente natural de ceticismo, que está de acordo com nossas práticas epistêmicas. Sustentarei também que esse tipo de ceticismo é o resultado inevitável de refletir sobre essas práticas epistêmicas.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2013-02-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p27710.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 No. 2 (2012); 277-295Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (2012); 277-295Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 16 n. 2 (2012); 277-2951808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277/24102Copyright (c) 2021 Jesus Antonio Coll Mármolinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessColl Mármol, Jesus Antonio2019-09-12T11:48:41Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/24168Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:48:41Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv La naturalidad del escepticismo
La naturalidad del escepticismo
La naturalidad del escepticismo
title La naturalidad del escepticismo
spellingShingle La naturalidad del escepticismo
Coll Mármol, Jesus Antonio
title_short La naturalidad del escepticismo
title_full La naturalidad del escepticismo
title_fullStr La naturalidad del escepticismo
title_full_unstemmed La naturalidad del escepticismo
title_sort La naturalidad del escepticismo
author Coll Mármol, Jesus Antonio
author_facet Coll Mármol, Jesus Antonio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Coll Mármol, Jesus Antonio
description In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-02-18
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277/24102
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 No. 2 (2012); 277-295
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 Núm. 2 (2012); 277-295
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 16 n. 2 (2012); 277-295
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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