Escepticismo y desacuerdo

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Laera, Rodrigo
Data de Publicação: 2012
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81
Resumo: Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes.
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spelling Escepticismo y desacuerdoEscepticismo y DesacuerdoEscepticismo y DesacuerdoWithin the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes.En el marco del debate epistemológico acerca del desacuerdo, el artículo se propone examinar la tesis escéptica que sostiene que, ante la imposibilidad de decidir racionalmente entre dos posiciones excluyentes, lo más prudente o lo único racional es suspender el juicio. Se expone la idea de que la fuente del escepticismo no es la vida ordinaria, lo cual imposibilita que el desacuerdo real entre pares epistémicos constituya su cimiento. Se intenta mostrar que los escenarios escépticos difieren ontológicamente de los escenarios cotidianos, sin que esta diferencia ontológica implique una diferencia epistémica, pues las prácticas epistémicas no varían de un escenario escéptico a otro que no lo es.No marco do debate epistemológico acerca do desacordo, este artigo propõe-se a examinar a tese cética que sustenta que, diante da impossibilidade de decidir racionalmente entre duas posições excludentes, o mais prudente ou a única coisa raiconal é suspender o juízo. Expomos a ideia de que a fonte do ceticismo não é a vida ordinária, o que impossibilita que o desacordo real entre pares epistêmicos constitua seu fundamento. Pretendemos mostrar que os cenários céticos diferem ontologicamente dos cenários cotidianos, sem que essa diferença ontológica implique uma diferença epistêmica, pois as práticas epistêmicas não variam de um cenário cético a outros tipos de cenário.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2012-08-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p8110.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2012); 81-97Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 Núm. 1 (2012); 81-97Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 16 n. 1 (2012); 81-971808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81/22772Copyright (c) 2021 Rodrigo Laerainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLaera, Rodrigo2019-09-12T11:43:41Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/21348Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:43:41Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Escepticismo y desacuerdo
Escepticismo y Desacuerdo
Escepticismo y Desacuerdo
title Escepticismo y desacuerdo
spellingShingle Escepticismo y desacuerdo
Laera, Rodrigo
title_short Escepticismo y desacuerdo
title_full Escepticismo y desacuerdo
title_fullStr Escepticismo y desacuerdo
title_full_unstemmed Escepticismo y desacuerdo
title_sort Escepticismo y desacuerdo
author Laera, Rodrigo
author_facet Laera, Rodrigo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Laera, Rodrigo
description Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-08-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81
10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n1p81/22772
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Rodrigo Laera
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Rodrigo Laera
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 No. 1 (2012); 81-97
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 16 Núm. 1 (2012); 81-97
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 16 n. 1 (2012); 81-97
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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