El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
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Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473 |
Resumo: | Van Fraassen’s Empiricist Structuralism has been threatened by what is known as the loss of reality objection: the pre-eminence of pragmatic factors in the scientific representation of phenomena seems to neglect the role of the world itself in the adequacy of theories. One of van Fraassen’s weapons for addressing to this objection is a set of methodological rules he calls criterion of empirical grounding. In the present work we question the effectiveness of this criterion (and the methodological strategy in general) to avoid objections such as the loss of reality. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empiristaEl criterio de empirical grounding en el Estructuralismo EmpiristaEl criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empiristaVan Fraassen’s Empiricist Structuralism has been threatened by what is known as the loss of reality objection: the pre-eminence of pragmatic factors in the scientific representation of phenomena seems to neglect the role of the world itself in the adequacy of theories. One of van Fraassen’s weapons for addressing to this objection is a set of methodological rules he calls criterion of empirical grounding. In the present work we question the effectiveness of this criterion (and the methodological strategy in general) to avoid objections such as the loss of reality.El Estructuralismo Empirista de van Fraassen ha sido puesto en jaque por lo que se conoce como la objeción de pérdida de la realidad: la preeminencia de los factores pragmáticos en la representación científica de los fenómenos parece soslayar el papel del mundo mismo en la adecuación de las teorías. Una de las armas de van Fraassen para responder a esta objeción es un conjunto de reglas metodológicas que denomina criterion of empirical grounding. En el presente trabajo cuestionamos la eficacia de dicho criterio (y de la estrategia metodológica en general) para eludir objeciones como la de pérdida de la realidad. O estruturalismo empírico de Van Fraassen foi posto em xeque pelo que é conhecido como a objeção da perda da realidade: a preeminência de fatores pragmáticos na representação científica dos fenômenos parece contornar o papel do próprio mundo na adequação das teorias. Uma das armas de van Fraassen para responder a essa objeção é um conjunto de regras metodológicas que ele chama de critério de fundamentação empírica. No presente trabalho questionamos a eficácia desse critério (e a estratégia metodológica em geral) para evitar objeções como a perda da realidade.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2018-05-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p47310.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 3 (2017); 473-482Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 3 (2017); 473-482Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 3 (2017); 473-4821808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473/pdfCopyright (c) 2021 Bruno Borge, Susana Luceroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBorge, BrunoLucero, Susana2018-05-07T14:02:03Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/54130Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2018-05-07T14:02:03Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista El criterio de empirical grounding en el Estructuralismo Empirista El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
title |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
spellingShingle |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista Borge, Bruno |
title_short |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
title_full |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
title_fullStr |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
title_full_unstemmed |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
title_sort |
El criterio de Empirical Grounding en el estructuralismo empirista |
author |
Borge, Bruno |
author_facet |
Borge, Bruno Lucero, Susana |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Lucero, Susana |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Borge, Bruno Lucero, Susana |
description |
Van Fraassen’s Empiricist Structuralism has been threatened by what is known as the loss of reality objection: the pre-eminence of pragmatic factors in the scientific representation of phenomena seems to neglect the role of the world itself in the adequacy of theories. One of van Fraassen’s weapons for addressing to this objection is a set of methodological rules he calls criterion of empirical grounding. In the present work we question the effectiveness of this criterion (and the methodological strategy in general) to avoid objections such as the loss of reality. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-05-07 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473 10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n3p473/pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Bruno Borge, Susana Lucero info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Bruno Borge, Susana Lucero |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 3 (2017); 473-482 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 3 (2017); 473-482 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 3 (2017); 473-482 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435113728114688 |